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UNIVERSITY  OF MINNESOTA  AND UNIVERSITY  OF WISCONSIN 
Business  Fixed  Investment  and  the 
Recent  Business  Cycle  in  Japan 
1. Introduction 
In the last decade,  the Japanese economy has gone through both its strong- 
est expansion  of the last twenty years and its most severe recession of the 
last forty years. During this decade, business  fixed investment  was unusu- 
ally volatile,  and in a sense  documented  below  seemed  to be a dominant 
factor in both the recent 1986-1991 boom and the post-1991 bust. In this 
paper we attempt to explain the behavior of business  fixed investment  in 
Japan, with extra attention  given  to the 1986-1994  cycle. 
We  consider  two  approaches,  one  quite  briefly,  the  other  in  some 
detail.  Both approaches  assume  a frictionless  world  in which  capital is 
accumulated  to  maximize  a present  value.  The  two  differ in  how  the 
present  value  is measured.  The approach presented  in brief is based on 
Tobin's Q, and uses  stock prices to measure  the relevant present  value. 
Japanese asset  prices zoomed  in the late 1980s, and then collapsed.  Our 
efforts  to link asset  prices and  investment  with  a Q-model  were,  how- 
ever,  quite  unsuccessful,  a result  consistent  with  a number  of  studies 
including  Hayashi  (1990) and Mullins and Wadwhani (1989). 
Our second  approach  is a neoclassical,  or flexible accelerator, model. 
Here,  we  compute  the  relevant  present  value  ourselves,  from data on 
output  and  the  tax-adjusted  cost  of capital.  Using  our model,  we  con- 
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clude that business investment in Japan  has responded to output and 
the cost of capital in a sensible way. This holds not only on average 
during our entire 1961-1994 sample but also in particular  during the 
1986-1994  period:  one does not have to give pride of place to the extraor- 
dinary asset price movements to tell a coherent story about the behavior 
of investment. 
Our formulation of the flexible accelerator  model takes account of a 
secular  increase  in the capital-output ratio  that occurred  during  our sam- 
ple. Using a one-sector stochastic growth model that includes costs of 
adjusting  capital,  we show that  this increase  can  be rationalized  as a result 
of exogenous change in the marginal  rate of transformation  between in- 
vestment and consumption.1  According  to the model, the secular  increase 
in the capital-output ratio  will be matched  by a corresponding  secular  fall 
in the relative  price  of investment goods. And we do find in the data  that, 
because of a fall in the relative  price  of investment  goods, the tax-adjusted 
cost of capital has fallen at roughly the same rate as the capital-output 
ratio has risen. 
Our empirical  work estimates a decision rule for capital  accumulation 
that can be derived either from a log-linear  approximation  of the growth 
model's first-order condition for the capital stock, or from a dynamic 
logarithmic  version of the well-known neoclassical model in which the 
capital stock adjusts partially  towards its target level each period. The 
target level is the (log of) the capital stock that equates the marginal 
product of capital to the cost of capital;  in our Cobb-Douglas specifica- 
tion this is the difference  between (the log of) output and (the log of) the 
cost of capital. We use both our model's decision rule and unrestricted 
autoregressions to model capital, in conjunction  with unrestricted  auto- 
regressions used to model both output and the cost of capital. These 
estimates are consistent with our model in three ways. 
First, the decision rule and the unrestricted  autoregressions for the 
capital stock are quantitatively  very similar.  Second, because of convex 
costs of adjusting the capital stock, forward-looking  firms will begin to 
adjust their capital stocks in advance of actual movements in the target 
level of capital. If firms make forecasts of movements in the target level 
using information not used by us,  this adjustment will show  up as 
Granger  causality  from capital  to the target  level. And we do indeed find 
such causality.  Third,  our logarithmic  model allows capital  to have differ- 
ent elasticities  with respect to output and the cost of capital.2  Because of 
1. The logic here is essentially  that of Greenwood  et al. (1995). 
2. This  property  is  shared  by  the  Bischoff  (1971) formulation  of  the  neoclassical  model, 
although  Bischoff appeals  to a putty-clay  distinction between  old and new capital rather 
than to the time-series  properties  of output  and the cost of capital. Business Fixed Investment  and the Recent Business Cycle in Japan  *  279 
costs  of  adjustment,  the  long-  and  short-run  responses  of capital to a 
shock to one of these variables will be stronger the more persistent  is the 
shock.  These  responses  will be quite small, for example,  if there is very 
little persistence  (lots of mean  reversion),  so that initial movements  are 
typically  followed  by reversions  back to initial levels  in output  and the 
cost  of  capital.  In  our  data,  output  shocks  are persistent  and  cost  of 
capital shocks are mean-reverting.  Correspondingly,  we find a large (and 
of course positive)  elasticity of capital with respect to output,  and a small 
(and of course  negative)  elasticity  of capital with  respect  to the cost  of 
capital. 
We use  the  estimates  of  the  decision  rule  to determine  whether  in- 
vestment  was  anomalous  during  1986-1991  or  1991-1994.  In  each  of 
the  two  periods,  we  decompose  unexpected  movement  in  the  capital 
stock into two  components.  One component  is the reaction of the capi- 
tal  stock  to  surprises  in  output  and  the  cost  of  capital;  the  second 
component  is a residual surprise to the capital stock. In each period,  we 
find  that  much  of  the  unexpected  movement  in  the  capital  stock  is 
attributable  to  output  shocks  and  cost  of capital shocks.  We conclude 
that given  the  1986-1991  and  1991-1994  movement  in output  and  the 
cost  of capital,  the  movements  in investment  that occurred are consis- 
tent with  historical experience. 
The paper has many limitations.  We emphasize  two here. First, we do 
not attempt to explain systematically  the behavior of any aggregate vari- 
able except  investment:  For the most  part we  leave  uninterpreted  what 
moves  output  and  the  cost  of capital (productivity?  monetary  policy?). 
Similarly, we  gloss  over  many  aspects  of  the  Japanese  economy-the 
current  crisis  in  the  banking  system,  for example-that  might  require 
close  attention  if  our  aim  were  to  provide  a  detailed  analysis  of  the 
causes  of the boom  and bust.  Second,  because  of space  and  time  con- 
straints  we  were  not  able  to  evaluate  a model  that  focuses  on  credit 
constraints  and  balance-sheet  effects  (e.g.,  Kiyotaki and  Moore,  1994, 
1995); it is entirely possible  that such a model will provide a more persua- 
sive  and more complete  explanation  of the behavior  of aggregates  than 
we provide  here. We hope  to address both limitations in future research. 
The paper is organized  as follows.  Section 2 describes the behavior of 
some  key variables.  Much of the material in this section  will be familiar 
to Japan experts.  Section 3 digresses  from the main theme  of the paper, 
and  discusses  the  evolution  of  balance-sheet  variables.  Section  4  de- 
scribes our general  equilibrium model,  Sections 5 and 6 our Q and flexi- 
ble accelerator models,  Section  7 how  we  constructed  the data used  in 
our empirical work,  Section  8 the results of the Q-regressions,  and Sec- 
tion 9 the results  of the flexible accelerator regressions. 280 *  KIYOTAKI  & WEST 
2.  Behavior  of  Aggregate  Variables 
In this  section,  we  describe  the recent behavior  of some  key variables. 
Our purposes  are to describe broad patterns to readers who are unfamil- 
iar with  the Japanese economy,  and to introduce  many  of the variables 
that  will  be  central  to  our  analysis.  Section  2.1  considers  some  basic 
national  income  and  product  account  (NIPA) data,  Section  2.2  capital 
stock  data,  and  Section  2.3  asset  price  data.  Section  2.4  summarizes. 
Unfortunately,  because  of  data  limitations,  the  frequency  of  the  data 
changes  from quarterly (NIPA) to annual (capital stock data) to quarterly 
and  semiannual  (asset  price data); it may  help  to note  that our subse- 
quent analysis actually uses annual data, typically using annual averages 
of the higher-frequency  underlying  data. 
Data sources are described in detail in a Data Appendix  available from 
the  authors.  Briefly, the  basic  sources  are as  follows.  NIPA data: the 
Japanese Economic Planning Agency  (henceforth,  EPA) and the Bank for 
International  Settlements;  monetary  and  financial data; the Bank of Ja- 
pan,  and  International  Financial  Statistics;  capital  stock  and  balance 
sheet data: the EPA. Except when  otherwise  stated, all data are real (1985 
prices).  All  quarterly  data  are expressed  at annual  rates.  All  data  are 
aggregate,  not per capita. 
2.1 NIPA  DATA 
Table 1 presents  data on  quarterly growth  rates for GDP and its major 
components.  As indicated  in the means  presented  for 1961-1973  in col- 
umn  (3) of the first row of Table 1, GDP growth averaged a phenomenal 
8.6% before the first OPEC shock.  There is no agreed-upon  date for the 
precise  end  of what  has  come  to be known  as the  "rapid growth"  era. 
But 1973:4 seems  as  good  a candidate  as any. Since  then,  growth  has 
averaged  3.3% [column  (4) in the first row of Table 1]. A comparison  of 
columns  (3) and  (4) for the  other rows  indicates  that the  slowdown  in 
growth  affected all the major components  of GDP. The dates in columns 
(5)-(7)  are trough  (1986:4) and  peak  (1991:2) dates  chosen  by the  EPA. 
To begin  motivating  our focus  on  business  fixed  investment,  let  us 
consider  in more detail the last expansion  and the ongoing  contraction. 
Table 2 divides  changes  in GDP into various components,  for the expan- 
sion  of 1986:4-1991:2 and for the  15 quarters from 1991:2 to the end  of 
our sample.  To read the table,  consider  column  (2). GDP in 1986:4 was 
334.2  trillion  1985 yen,  or about  3.3 billion  dollars at 100 yen/dollar.  It 
increased  by 80.5 trillion yen  from 1986:4 to 1991:2 [row (2), column  (2); 
Table 1, column  (6) indicates  that the corresponding  compound  growth 
rate is 4.8% per year]. GDP further increased by a paltry 5.9 trillion yen Table 1  GROWTH RATES AND  STANDARD  DEVIATIONS OF GDP AND  ITS COMPONENTS, 
SELECTED SUBPERIODS 
(1) 
Share of GDP,  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Share61:1-95:1  61:1-95:1  61:1-73:4  73:4-95:1  73:4-91:2  86:4-91:2  91:2-95:1of 
GDP, 
61:1-95:1  61:1-95:1  61:1-73:4  73:4-95:1  73:4-91:2  86:4-91:2  91:2-95:1 
1.00 
Private 






6.5  11.9 

































5.9  14.2  0.9  0.9  5.6  0.8 

























9.4  13.5  7.0  7.9 









7.4  13.0  4.1  4.4  12.5 











The data are quarterly,  real (1985 yen),  seasonally  adjusted  and expressed  at annual  rates. Growth rates are computed  by averaging 
log differences  beginning  with  the quarter following  the start date; the column  (7) figure, for examples,  averages  log differences  in the 
15 quarters from 91:3 to 95:1.  "Private P and  E" is gross  private fixed capital  formation  of plant and equipment;  "residential"  is the 
same for residences.  The rates of growth  for inventory  investment  are the rates of growth  of the level,  not the change. 
GDP Table 2  LEVEL AND  CHANGE IN NIPA AGGREGATES, MOST RECENT CYCLE 
(3)  (4) 
Private Investment  (6)  (7) 
(1)  (2)  Pata  n  5  -() 
() 
Plant and  Residential  Private  Government(8) 
Date  GDP  Equipment  Inventories  Consumption  Cons.  and  Investment  Net  Exports 
(1)  86:4  334.2  54.7  16.5  0.5  197.8  57.0  7.6 
(2)  80.5  37.0  4.8  2.9  38.7  3.8  -6.7 
(3)  91:2  414.7  91.7  21.3  3.4  236.5  60.9  1.0 
(4)  5.9  -19.5  0.7  -1.4  12.6  14.5  -0.9 
(5)  95:1  420.7  72.2  22.0  2.0  249.1  75.4  0.1 
Rows (1), (3), and (5) present  the value of the indicated  national  income  and product  account  components,  in trillions  of real, seasonally  adjusted  1985 
yen.  Rows (2) and (4) present  the change  in each component,  86:4-91:2  [row (2)] and 91:2-95:1  [row (4)]. The inventory  investment  figure in column  (5)  includes  inventory  investment  by the government.  The sum of components  may not add to the total because  of rounding. Business Fixed Investment  and the Recent  Business Cycle in Japan  ?  283 
between  1991:2 and 1995:1. Columns  (3)-(8)  give the corresponding  fig- 
ures for some  major components  of GDP. 
It may be seen  that the changes  in GDP went  hand in hand with large 
changes  in private plant and equipment  investment.  While such invest- 
ment  has  averaged  about  15% of GDP in the  sample,  its increase  was 
nearly half (37.0/80.5) that of the increase in GDP from 1986:4 to 1991:2, 
and its 19.5-trillion-yen  decline from 1991:2 to 1995:1 was associated with 
a minuscule  increase in GDP.3 
Complementary  evidence  on  this  comovement  of  GDP and  private 
plant  and  equipment  investment  is  provided  by  the  predictions  of  a 
VAR, which  we  briefly summarize  here.  Using  a VAR in the arithmetic 
differences  in  the  six variables  listed  in columns  (3)-(8)  in Table 2, we 
decomposed  movements  in GDP and  in each  of  the  six variables  into 
expected  and unexpected  components,  for the last cycle. Unsurprisingly, 
we  found  that  GDP  growth  from  1986:4 to  1991:2 was  substantially 
higher than was expected  in 1986:4, and that GDP growth from 1991:2 to 
1995:1 was much lower than was expected  in 1991:2. We also found  that 
when  we  broke the GDP forecast error into errors in forecasting each of 
the  six components  in Table 2,  the  dominant  element  was  the forecast 
error in plant and equipment  investment. 
We conclude  that a first step  in understanding  the recent behavior  of 
the  Japanese  economy  is  to  understand  private  plant  and  equipment 
investment,  and that is the focus of our paper. 
2.2 CAPITAL  STOCK  DATA 
Our capital stock data are those  for nonfinancial  corporations.  We focus 
on  this  sector because  its investment  is largely  congruent  with  that of 
private investment  in plant and equipment.  In 1993, for example,  over 
80% of  such  investment  was  accounted  for by corporations,  and,  con- 
versely,  over 80% of total investment  by nonfinancial  corporations  con- 
sisted  of investment  in plant and equipment.  Our capital stock data also 
reflect  some  public  and  corporate  residential  investment  (about 5% of 
total sectoral investment  in 1993) and some plant and equipment  invest- 
ment by public corporations  such as NTT, the telephone  company  (about 
10% in 1993).4 
3. That the change  in inventory  investment  is a small part of the change in GDP is consis- 
tent with  previous  downturns  in Japan. See West (1992). That fluctuations  in plant and 
equipment  investment  have  been  central  to  the  last  cycle  is  noted  in,  for example, 
Economic  Planning  Agency  (1994, p. 44). 
4. Many  small  firms  are  included  in  this  sector.  According  to  the  1991 Establishment 
Census  of Japan, the total employment  of nonfinancial  corporations  is 41.8 million.  Of 
this  total,  13.5 million  work  at corporations  of a single  establishment,  with  no branch 
offices,  of fewer  than  100 employed,  and only  4.6 million  work at corporations  whose 284 - KIYOTAKI  & WEST 
This  capital  stock  includes  both  structures  and  equipment;  unfortu- 
nately, these two types of capital cannot be distinguished  as is convention- 
ally done  in U.S. investment  studies.  The corresponding  output variable 
used  in our analysis  is what  the  EPA calls "output  of industry." Here, 
"industry" includes,  for example,  production  of services and residential 
construction: apart from statistical discrepancy, industry output  = GDP- 
(output of government)-  (output of nonprofit institutions  serving house- 
holds).  The capital stock and output of industry are only available annu- 
ally. Some  details  on conversion  to 1985 prices are given  in a footnote.5 
Figure  la  plots  the  growth  rate of  capital stock,  with  shaded  areas 
depicting  contractions.6  Once  again,  growth  rates were  astounding  be- 
fore 1973. The effects  on capital growth  of the 1986-1991 boom  and the 
1992-1994  collapse  in plant and equipment  investment  are apparent in 
the picture: capital growth  was  at a post-1974 high  during the boom,  a 
1961-1994  low  during  the collapse.  Figure lb  and c plot the levels  and 
growth  rates of output  of industry  and of GDP. Figure lb indicates  that 
industry  output  comprises  the bulk of GDP, Figure lc that the two move 
closely  together  but that industry  output is more volatile. 
Figure  ld  plots  the  capital-output  ratio.  A  steep  upward  trend  is 
apparent.  Growth in this ratio was particularly rapid in 1969-1975,  but it 
appears  that more  or less  steady  growth  has continued  since  then.  We 
document  below  that there is a corresponding  downward  trend in the 
ratio of  the  deflator  for private  investment  in plant  and  equipment  to 
that of the output  deflator (see Section 7 and Figure 4).7 These trends are 
stocks are publicly traded. Therefore, our study may complement panel studies of 
investment by publicly  traded  corporations. 
5. The EPA  provides the data in 1985  yen for 1969-1993.  For 1961-1968  we constructed  a 
real capital-stock  figure from the nominal  figure  and the deflator  for private  investment 
in plant and equipment,  and we constructed  a real  output  series from  nominal  and 1980- 
based data  by assuming that inflation  rates  in 1985  prices  were the same as those in 1980 
prices. The base year for the real 1994  capital  stock  and output of industry  was 1990;  we 
converted  to 1985  prices  by assuming real growth rates  were the same in 1990  and 1985 
prices. 
6. For  quarterly  data, we use turning  points defined  by the EPA  [although  EPA  documents 
sometimes seem ambiguous, for example as to whether the most recent  peak is 1991:1 
(EPA, 1994, p.  418) or 1991:2 (EPA, 1994, p.  46)]. To define  annual  turning points,  we 
looked at GDP growth in the years surrounding  the EPA  dates. For example, for the 
most recent cycle, the rate of GDP  growth in 1985,  1986,  and 1987  was 5.0, 2.6, and 4.1; 
for 1990, 1991,  and 1992  the figures  were 4.8, 4.2, and 1.0. This suggested a 1986  trough 
and a 1991 peak. After completing this paper, we found that the EPA  (1996, p. 1) has 
defined 1993:4  to be a trough, a choice not obviously  in accord  with the annual growth 
rates of GDP plotted in Figure  lc. 
7. Fumio  Hayashi  has informed  us that there  is some evidence that the published  figure  for 
the capital  stock in 1970  is too low. When combined  with reasonable  measures  of gross 
investment, this will cause overstatement  of the growth of the capital  stock, particularly 
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not due to the particular definition  of output or capital. The trend in the 
capital-output  ratio, and in the ratio of a capital to output-goods  defla- 
tor, is  equally  evident  when  (for example)  capital includes  inventories 
and fixed capital of not just the nonfinancial  corporate sector but that for 
the whole  economy,  and when  output is GDP (not depicted  in Figure 1). 
Approximate  constancy  of the capital-output  ratio is one  of the basic 
stylized  facts of growth  theory  (Kaldor, 1963; Simon,  1990). Perhaps the 
Japanese growth  in the ratio is a transitional phenomenon  rationalizable 
in a familiar way  by  the  Cass-Koopmans-Solow  growth  model.  If so, 
experience  from the  United  States perhaps  suggests  that a steady  state 
has been reached,  since the aggregate capital-output  ratio was about 2.5 
by the end of our sample. 
Our  empirical  work  does  not  take  a  stand  on  whether  or not  this 
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growth  is  transitional,  although  our model  in Section  4 does  point  out 
that an indefinite  continuance  of the  trend is perfectly  consistent  with 
balanced  growth.  Rather, we  take the message  of Figure ld  to be that a 
good  model  of investment  must account for the growth  in the ratio that 
has occurred. 
2.3 PRICE  AND ASSET  PRICE  DATA 
As  is well  known,  Japanese  stock  and  land  prices  zoomed  in  the  late 
1980s, and then  collapsed.  Figure 2a plots the real (1985 prices) semian- 
nual (end of quarters 1 and 3) value of the Topix index along with corre- 
sponding  dividends  multiplied  by 10. (The closest  U.S. equivalent  to the 
Topix is  probably  the  S  and  P  500.  Throughout  this  subsection,  real 
values  are computed  using  the  GDP deflator.)  The  "bubble" period  is 
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typically  considered  to have begun  late in 1985, or towards  the left end 
of the next to last shaded  area in the graph. A sharp peak occurred at the 
end  of 1989, anticipating  the turndown  in real activity. In the four years 
from 1985:3 to 1989:3, the real value of the index increased by a factor of 
about 2.5,  implying  an annual rate of appreciation of 23.1%. The subse- 
quent decline left 1995:1 stock prices barely 15% above their 1985:3 value. 
As  may  be  seen,  dividend-price  ratios are small by U.S.  standards: in 
1985:3 they were  1.01%, and had fallen to 0.96% by 1995:1. 
Figure 2b plots  real, semiannual  (end of quarters 1 and 3) land prices, 
measured  as the average price in all urban districts. The runup began  at 
the end of 1986, and the peak occurred in early 1991, so that land prices 
followed  rather than  preceded  stock prices.  From 1986:3 to 1991:1, the 
index  increased  by about half, with  an implied  annual rate of apprecia- 
tion of about 8.4%. The 1995:1 value of the index is about 20% above the 
1986:3 value.  It should  be noted  that the comparable land-price index for 
the  six largest  cities  in Japan is more volatile,  increasing  by a factor of 
more  than 2 between  1986:3 and  1991:1, and declining  more  than 40% 
since then. 
Figure 2c plots  end-of-quarter  values  of a safe nominal  interest  rate, 
the  call rate.  (Among  U.S.  rates,  the closest  equivalent  is probably the 
Federal funds  rate.) It also plots our measure of the business  borrowing 
rate. For 1992-1994,  the latter is the end-of-quarter value of the Bank of 
Japan series  "average  contracted  interest  rates on  new  loans  and  dis- 
counts,  long-term."  For 1961-1991,  the  borrowing  rate was  set  to  the 
quarterly holding  yield  of long-term  bonds  of NTT, the main telephone 
company,  plus  1%. The risk premium  of 1% corresponds  to the average 
spread between  the series for new loans and discounts  and the NTT rate, 
for  the  period  for which  we  had  data  on  both  series  (1992:1 through 
1993:1).  It may  be  seen  in  Figure  2c  that  an  inverted  term  structure 
causes  the call rate to be above the borrowing  rate on occasion. 
Interest rates increased  during  the recent 1986-1991  period of expan- 
sion  and  fell during  the  ongoing  contraction.  The increases  in the  call 
rate after mid-1989 are commonly  thought  to have been part of an inten- 
tional attempt  by the Bank of Japan to "pierce the bubble" in stock and 
land  prices,  and  to  cool  down  an  overheated  economy.  Similarly, the 
recent declines  seem  to have resulted from explicit attempts by the Bank 
to spark the economy. 
The final figure is that of the quarterly real yen-dollar  exchange  rate. 
The nominal  rate at the end of quarter was deflated by the GDP deflators 
for Japan and the U.S. (1985=100).  The real appreciation of the yen in the 
fixed rate era (1961-1971)  reflects the generally higher rate of inflation in 
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2.4 SUMMARY 
The  GDP boom  of  1986-1991  and  collapse  of  1992-1994  went  hand  in 
hand  with  a boom  and  collapse  in  business  investment  in  plant  and 
equipment.  This  motivates  us  to  focus  on  such  investment.  Since,  in 
turn, the models  we  use are formulated in terms of the capital stock, we 
turn  to  a capital  stock  that pretty  much  moves  one  to  one  with  such 
investment,  the capital stock of nonfinancial  corporations.  Because such 
data are available only annually, the rest of the analysis is annual. 
A runup  and decline  in stock and land prices preceded  the real cycle 
by a year or two,  suggesting  the possibility  of a link running from asset 
price  and  balance-sheet  movements  to  business  investment.  We con- 
sider this possibility  both with formal tests of Q-theory (Sections 5 and 8) 
and  an informal  examination  of data patterns  that are central to credit 
constraint  models  such  as Kiyotaki and Moore (1994, 1995) (Section 3). 
The pattern in the cost of capital is less evident,  at least for 1986-1991. 
But whatever  the pattern,  the secular growth in the capital-output  ratio 
suggests  a secular fall in the return to capital.  So we  are compelled  to 
consider  the trend as well  as the cyclical behavior of the cost of capital. 
Sections 6 and 9 investigate  our version of a flexible accelerator model,  in 
which  capital  accumulation  depends  on  both  output  and  the  cost  of 
capital. 
3. Movements  in Balance  Sheets  in 1961-1994 
This section  digresses  from the analysis  in the rest of the paper to sum- 
marize  some  basic observations  on  the movement  of balance  sheets  of 
nonfinancial  corporations  during  1961-1994.  The  aggregate  balance- 
sheet  data we  discuss  are consistent  with  the NIPA data on saving  and 
investment.  The data are available annually, at the end of the year. Most 
are available only at current prices (an exception  is the capital stock). In 
principle,  assets  are valued  at market rather than book value.  We focus 
on  the balance  sheet  of the nonfinancial  incorporated  business  sector.8 
We combine  some  underlying  items  into  four types  of assets  [items 
(3.1) to  (3.4) below],  a liability  [item (3.5)],  and  net  worth  [item (3.6)]: 
(3.1)  capital  +  inventories  (denoted  pKtK,  where  PKt =  1 in  1985):  The  sum 
of net fixed assets  (capital) and inventories. 
8. Four other sectoral balance sheets are maintained:  financial  institutions;  households, 
including  unincorporated  nonfinancial  enterprises;  nonprofit  institutions  serving  house- 
holds; general  government.  Note that  in contrast  to the U.S. balance-sheet  data  from  the 
Federal  Reserve System, Japan  lumps unincorporated  enterprises  with the household 
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(3.2)  Land (pLtLt):  Nonreproducible  tangible assets,  excluding  improve- 
ments  in land insofar as such improvements  are included  in NIPA 
business  fixed investment. 
(3.3)  Equity (pEtEt):  Holdings  of shares of other corporations. 
(3.4)  Monetary assets (Mt): Financial assets  apart from equity; this in- 
cludes,  for example,  money,  debt, and trade credit. 
(3.5)  Debt (Bt):  All liabilities, apart from net worth and the value of eq- 
uity; this includes,  for example,  debt and trade credit. 
(3.6)  Net worth (Wt):  Net worth plus the value of own  equity. 
Table 3a and  b summarize  trends  and  fluctuations  of these  balance- 
sheet  items.  These  tables present  the real value and growth rate of each 
Table  3  BALANCE  SHEETS  OF NONFINANCIAL  CORPORATIONS,  SELECTED 
YEARS 
(a) Levels 
1961  1969  1973  1977  1981  1985  1990  1994 
Capital+ 
inventories  63.8  137.1  242.0  258.8  320.1  358.1  474.0  538.5 
Land  33.0  91.5  180.5  149.5  224.2  261.7  633.6  465.9 
Equity  18.1  26.5  53.1  35.2  52.7  88.3  221.8  152.2 
Monetary 
assets  59.8  172.8  263.6  251.6  313.5  387.5  534.6  514.1 
Debts  92.7  249.0  383.5  385.2  463.6  562.5  803.7  867.7 
Net worth  81.9  178.8  355.7  309.9  446.9  533.0  1060.3  802.8 
Total  assets  174.6  476.8  739.2  695.1  910.5  1095.5  1864.0  1670.6 
(b)  Growth  Rates 
61-69  69-73  73-77  77-81  81-85  85-90  90-94  61-94 
Capital+ 
inventories  10.0  15.3  1.7  5.5  2.8  5.8  3.2  6.7 
Land  13.6  18.5  -4.6  10.7  3.9  19.3  -7.4  8.4 
Equity  4.9  19.0  -9.8  10.6  13.8  20.2  -9.0  6.7 
Monetary 
assets  14.1  11.1  -1.2  5.7  5.4  6.6  -1.0  6.7 
Debts  13.1  11.4  0.1  4.7  5.0  7.4  1.9  7.0 
Net worth  10.3  18.8  -3.4  9.6  4.5  14.7  -6.7  7.2 
Total  assets  11.8  15.7  -1.5  7.0  4.7  11.2  -2.7  7.1 
Notes: 
1.  Units in panel (a) are trillions of 1985 yen,  computed  by deflating the nominal data with the GDP deflator. Data 
are for end of year. 
2.  The annualized  growth  rates in panel  (b) are computed  from the end of the first year to the end of the second 
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balance-sheet  item,  computed  by deflating  the supplied  nominal  values 
with the GDP deflator (1985=100).  Here is how we characterize the dates 
in the  tables,  which  do not match the official business-cycle  dates  used 
in  other  parts  of  the  paper.  The  period  1962-1969  is part of the  rapid 
economic  growth  era of 1950s and  1960s; 1970-1973  and  1986-1990  are 
periods  with  asset  price inflation; 1974-1977  and 1991-1994  are periods 
of  slow  growth,  which  for brevity  we  call recessions;  1978-1981  and 
1982-1985  are periods  of relatively steady growth on average. 
To fix the scale of the entries in Table 3, it may help to note that the 1990 
real GDP is about 399 trillion yen. So land is large relative to GDP, and is an 
important  share-more  than a quarter-of  total assets.  A second  point 
worth  noting  is that cross-holdings  of equity  are an important  share- 
about a tenth-of  assets.  Because land and equity are important parts of 
assets,  net worth is sensitive  to fluctuations  in the prices of such assets.9 
The figures  in Tables 3a and b show  three patterns.  The most impor- 
tant is that all six balance-sheet  items  tend  to expand  together  rapidly 
during  booms  and  tend  to  shrink  (or grow  more  slowly)  during  the 
recessions.  This is true not only for the real assets-capital+inventories, 
land,  and  equity-but  also  for the  real value  of  monetary  assets  and 
debts.  Second,  for  the  33-year  period  1961-1994,  capital+inventories, 
equity,  and  monetary  assets  grow  at a similar rate,  with  debt  and  net 
worth  growing  at a slightly  higher  and land at a distinctly  higher  rate. 
Third, movements  in equity, land,  and net worth tend  to be more vola- 
tile than those  in capital+inventories,  monetary assets,  and debt. 
A natural next question would be how much of these movements  is due 
to net acquisition  of these  items,  and how  much to the changes  in asset 
prices relative to the GDP deflator. Net acquisitions of each balance sheet 
item are measured in the capitalfinance  accounts of the sectors, as shown in 
Table 4.  The change  in the market value  of an asset  or liability may be 
written  as the  sum  of net acquisitions  and revaluation  due  to changing 
prices. This revaluation is captured in the reconciliation  accounts,  with the 
identity (year-to-year change in an entry on the balance sheet) = (entry on 
the capital finance account)  +  (entry on the reconciliation account).10 For 
example,  for capital + inventories  K, and monetary assets Mt, 
9. It should  be noted  that the reliability of the data on land and equity is suspect.  There is 
some  evidence  that land values  are overstated,  and in a way that is not particularly easy 
to correct (see  Ando  and Auerbach,  1990). Equity values,  on the other, may be under- 
stated,  since for nontraded  equities  face value is used.  These mismeasurements  of land 
and equity  may cause serious  problems  in constructing  Tobin's Q. 
10. While the main function of the reconciliation account is to capture capital gains and losses 
due to changing prices, the reconciliation account of capital appears to include as well (1) 
the difference between  historical and replacement cost of depreciation (Hayashi (1986)), 
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Table  4 
Outflow  Inflow 
Real  Transactions 
Gross fixed capital  formation  (IK')  Savings (including  net  (St) 
+ inventory investment  capital  transfers) 
Net purchase of land  (ITt)  Capital  consumption 
Savings-investment  (DSIt)  (depreciation)  (Dt) 
Financial  transactions 
Net acquisition  of equity  (IEt)  Net increase  in liabilities  (IBt) 
Net acquisition  of monetary  assets  (IMt)  Net issue of equity  (IWt) 
Financial surplus  (FSt) 
increase in the market value 
of capital+inventories 
PKtKt -  PKt-Kt-l 
Mt -  Mt-_ 
reconciliation  =  net investment  +  re 
account for Kt, 
=  IK' -  D 
=  IMt 
+ RKt, 
+  RMt. 
We can roughly  decompose  the change in the real value of each entry 
in terms of the GDP deflator as the sum of real net acquisitions  plus the 
real capital gains  of each entry: 
P,K  pK  -  :=  +[(IKt 
- 
Dt+  RK[  t1  1-)  P  -i]  PKtK  - PKt-1  -  t  -  +  1  PK  1 
Pyt  Pyt-1  Pyt  yt  Pyt  Pyt  -1 
(3.9) 
M,  Mt-1  IMt 
Pyt  Pyt-1  Pyt 
-  -  )  Mt-1 
pet  Pyt-1 
+  +  Py  -  -  M 
- Py  t  Pyt  Pyt 
where pet is the expectation of the price level pyt  at date t -  1. [This expecta- 
tion was computed  from the fitted value of an AR(1) in the inflation rate.] 
Equation (3.9) says that the change in the real value of capital+ inventories 
is equal to the sum of the real values  of net investment  and capital gains. 
We regard the reconciliation account RKt as a measure of nominal capital 
gains,  and construct real capital gains as RKt/pyt  plus a term due to infla- 
tion. We apply this decomposition  to land and equity. Concerning mone- 
tary assets  in (3.10),  we  consider  the effect of expected  inflation  in the 
second term on the right-hand side as a part of net acquisition of monetary 
assets;  the underlying  idea is that expected  inflation affects nominal  re- 
turns on monetary  assets.  Thus only unexpected  inflation and the recon- 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
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ciliation account figure into computation  of real capital gains [the last two 
terms of the right-hand side of (3.10)]. We decompose  similarly for debts. 
Then the change  in the real net worth becomes 
Wt  Wt  = St + IWt  + FSt-  DSIt  1  1i  +  -_  (Mt-1 -  Bt-1) 
Pyt  Pyt-1  Pyt  Pyt  Pyt- 
RK +RL,+REt+RMt-RBt  +  1  1 
+  pt+  "---)  (PKt-1K'  -1+PLt-1-l  -  1+PEt 1Et1) 
P  yt  Pyt  Pyt-1 
1  1 
+  (-  -  )  (Mt-1 -Bt-  ).  (3.11) 
Pyt  Pyt 
The first line of the right-hand side is the real value of the net saving and 
issues  of own  equity, together  with the effects of expected  inflation.  The 
second  and third lines are real capital gains on capital+inventories,  land 
and equity, and monetary  assets  net of debts.l 
Table 5 presents  the total real value of net acquisitions and capital gains 
during each period.  (The final period is 1991-1993 rather than 1991-1994 
because of some incompatibilities  introduced by data revisions made with 
the release of the 1994 data.) The first point to note is that real capital gains 
are the major factor in fluctuations  of net worth of nonfinancial  corpora- 
tions, rather than net savings and net issue of equities. These capital gains 
and  losses  are large  even  when  compared  to  annual  GDP  (1990 real 
GDP=399  trillion).  During  the  1986-1990  asset  price inflation,  real net 
worth increased  by about 528 trillion 1985 yen,  of which 430 trillion were 
capital gains  and  98 trillion were  net  savings  and  net  issues  of equity. 
During 1991-1993,  net worth dropped by 274 trillion, with a capital loss of 
311 trillion partially offset  by 37 trillion of net  saving  and net issues  of 
equity. A particularly important source of real capital gains and losses  is 
fluctuations  of land and equity  prices  (although,  as noted  above,  these 
prices may be measured poorly). This pattern also holds for the 1970-1973 
asset price inflation and the 1974-1977  recession. 
A second  point to note is that the issue of debt is very procyclical. Debt 
expansion  was particularly notable during the 1970-1973 and 1986-1990 
asset price inflations,  and contraction (or slow growth) of debt is notable 
during  the  1974-1977  and  1991-1993  recessions.  Procyclical movement 
11. In theory, the difference  between saving and investment in real transactions  should 
equal the financial  surplus in financial  transactions.  In the data, however, they do not 
match because of differences in sources. So we include this gap as a part of net 
acquisition  of net worth. Business Fixed Investment  and the Recent Business Cycle in Japan  ?  293 
Table 5  NET ACQUISITIONS AND  REAL CAPITAL GAINS OF NONFINANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS,  SELECTED  YEARS 
62-69  70-73  74-77  78-81  82-85  86-90  91-93  62-93 
Capital+  na  108.5  89.1  75.7  83.4  85.5  146.5  94.0  682.7 
inv.  cg  -36.0  15.8  -58.9  -22.0  -47.6  -30.6  -42.6  -221.9 
Land  na  14.5  27.1  5.9  1.0  4.4  36.6  3.5  96.0 
cg  43.9  62.0  -36.9  73.7  33.0  335.4  -161.6  349.5 
Equity  na  4.7  3.2  1.9  2.5  1.2  12.8  -4.4  21.9 
cg  3.7  23.4  -19.8  15.0  34.4  120.7  -84.2  93.2 
Monetary  na  108.9  107.0  -12.3  38.0  45.4  167.9  -57.9  397.0 
assets  cg  4.4  -16.2  0.2  23.9  28.6  -20.7  15.4  35.6 
Debts  na  161.2  159.4  7.4  57.0  77.7  266.2  -1.7  727.2 
cg  -5.0  -24.9  -5.7  21.4  21.2  -25.0  38.3  20.3 
Net worth  na  75.5  67.0  63.8  67.8  58.9  97.6  37.0  467.6 
cg  21.0  109.9  -109.7  69.2  27.2  429.8  -311.3  236.1 
Units are trillions  of 1985  yen. "na"  is net acquisitions,  "cg"  is capital  gains, computed  in accordance  with equations 
(3.9), (3.10),  and (3.11).  See text for additional  details. 
of the debt and net worth of nonfinancial firms is consistent  with models 
that emphasize  the interaction between  credit and investment  as a possi- 
ble propagation  mechanism  over business  cycles.  For example,  Kiyotaki 
and Moore  (1994) show  that small temporary shocks  to technology  and 
income  distributions  may  generate  large and  persistent  fluctuations  of 
aggregate  output  and  asset  prices  through  the  interaction  of collateral 
value,  credit, and investment. 
A third point  is that,  in terms of trend,  net  saving  and net issues  of 
own  equity  are important  sources  of upward  movement  of net  worth, 
along with  the upward  trend in the relative prices of land and equity. In 
contrast,  capital+inventories  generally  experiences  real capital losses, 
because,  as depicted  in Figure 4, the price of capital is falling relative to 
the GDP deflator. A final point is that nonfinancial  corporations bought 
land  and  equities  net  in  1986-1990  and  sold  equities  net in 1991-1993. 
4. A Simple  General  Equilibrium  Model 
In this section  we  present  a simple  general equilibrium model  of invest- 
ment.  Our  aims  are  twofold.  Following  Greenwood,  Hercowitz,  and 
Krusell (1995), the  first is to link theoretically  the upward  trend in the 
capital-output  ratio  and  the  downward  trend  in  the  ratio  of  the 
investment-goods  deflator to the output  deflator, and to show  that such 
trends  in  fact  are  consistent  with  balanced  growth.  To illustrate  that 
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model,  we  include  standard  features  such  as elastic  labor supply  that 
do not play a role in the empirical work [and could,  but do not, include 
still more  features  such  as government  and foreign  sectors; see  Green- 
wood,  Hercowitz,  and Krusell (1995) or Jones and Manuelli (1994)]. The 
second  aim  is  to  motivate  the  regressions  presented  and  discussed  in 
subsequent  sections.  We  do,  however,  forewarn  the  reader  that  the 
model  is rather stylized,  and we  do not constrain the empirical work to 
fit precisely  in the model. 
The  model  is  in  the  vein  of  the  closed-economy  one-sector  Cass- 
Koopmans  model,  but with  (exogenous)  change  in the marginal rate of 
transformation between  investment  goods  and consumption  goods.  The 
production  function  and basic resource constraints are 
Yt =  AF(Kt, HtNtA,)  = AtK(HtNtAt)-  ,  (4.1) 
Kt =  (1 - 8)Kt-_  + It,  (4.2) 
Y  t  =  tNt + Pt(It +-  XtKt-),  (4.3) 
Kt -  GKKt-  _  It 
xt=  G  +  1 -  l-.  (4.4) 
Kt-1  Kt-l 
In  (4.1),  the  aggregate  output  Yt is  a  Cobb-Douglas  function  of  the 
aggregate  capital  stock  Kt, the  labor hours  per worker Ht, the  popula- 
tion Nt, the deterministic  labor productivity  level At, and the stationary 
stochastic  aggregate  productivity  level At. In (4.2), capital accumulation 
proceeds  as  usual,  with  8 the  constant  depreciation  rate and  It gross 
investment.  In (4.3),  output  is used  for per capita consumption  5t and 
investment.  Pit is  the  relative  price  of  investment  goods.  It equals  an 
exogenous  marginal  rate  of  transformation  between  investment  and 
consumption  goods.  The  adjustment  cost  (4/2)XtKt_1  is  increasing  in 
the  deviation  of  capital  growth  from  its  steady-state  rate  GK. Baxter 
and  Crucini  (1993)  and  Cogley  and  Nason  (1995) use  similar  adjust- 
ment  costs.  In  (4.4),  Xt is  defined  as  the  rate of  capital accumulation 
over  its  steady-state  gross  growth  rate GK (which  is solved  for below). 
Preferences  of the representative  household  are given by the expected 
discounted  utility 
Et E  JNt+j[u(t+j)-  Bt+jv(Ht+j)]  (4.5) 
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where  u(r) = (~1-O  -  1)/(1 -  o), v(H) = Hl+  (1 +  v), and B, is a measure of 
the disutility  of labor. 
Let the aggregate  productivity  At be strictly positive,  with  mean  one, 
and follow a finite-state  stationary Markov process.  Let the labor produc- 
tivity At, disutility  of labor Bt, and population  Nt grow, and let the rela- 
tive price of investment  goods  P1t  shrink, at constant rates, 
At+1  =  GAAt,  Bt+1  =  GBBt,  Nt+  = GNNt,  PIt+1  = Pt/GpI,  (4.6) 
GB =  (GA(GpI)  /(1-  ))1-  <  (3GN)-1.  (4.7) 
where  all Gi >  1, i = A, B, N, PI; (4.7) guarantees no trend in labor hours. 
It may  be  shown  that  the  competitive  equilibrium  exists.  The corre- 
sponding  social  planner's  problem  maximizes  the  preferences  of  the 
representative  household,  subject to the resource  constraint.  The first- 
order conditions  for labor hours and investment  are given by 
u'(t(I  -  O)Y,  =  B V'(H),  (4.8) 
HtNt 
P,i(1 + 4Xt) = 0-  + Et  1(  ()  P1t[l  -  8 +  Xt+1 (GK  + 0.5X,t+)]).  (4.9) 
Kt  I  0 
Equation (4.8) equates  the marginal product of labor in terms of utility to 
the marginal disutility  of labor. Equation (4.9) equates the marginal cost 
of investment  to the marginal value of an additional unit of capital. The 
marginal  value  has  three  terms:  the  marginal  product  of  capital,  the 
expected  discounted  resale value  of remaining capital, and the expected 
marginal saving  of adjustment  costs the following  period. 
Let us first consider  the growth implications  of the model.  By examin- 
ing  (4.1) to (4.9),  we  see  that there is no trend in labor hours,  and that 
one plus the growth rate of aggregate capital is given by GK  = GAGNGf1-  ). 
Output grows at the rate GAGN(GJ)1"-  ),  which is lower than that of aggre- 
gate capital by a factor of Gpj.  It follows  that KIY is growing  at the rate 
that  P,t is  shrinking,  thus  establishing  the  desired  theoretical  link be- 
tween  the  two  trends  observed  in the  data.  Further, define  the  cost of 
capital Ct as the opportunity  cost of owning  one unit of capital from date 
t to date t+1: 
Ct =  P,  (=  1 
- 
Ep  (-) t  (+;))  (4.10) 296 *  KIYOTAKI  & WEST 
Let  K7 -  Yt/Ct;  K* is  the  target  capital  stock,  which,  apart  from  a 
proportionality  factor 0, would  obtain if there were no adjustment  costs 
to  investment.  Observe  that the  cost  of  capital Ct is  also  shrinking  at 
rate Gpj.  So the rates of growth  actual (Kt)  and target (K*)  capital are the 
same. 
We now  show  that the investment  first-order condition  (4.9) may be 
approximated  in a computationally  convenient  fashion,  as a dynamic, 
logarithmic  version  of a flexible  accelerator familiar from Hall and Jor- 
genson  (1967). Let Mt+1  = (PIt+1/Pit)  [,Bu'  (,t+)lu'  (ct)]  be the intertemporal 
marginal  rate of substitution  in terms of investment  goods.  Upon  ma- 
nipulating  (4.9), we  obtain 
Xt = 4-  (  1  Y  +  Et[Mt+lXt+l(GK  + 0.5Xt+)].  (4.11) 
Pit  CtKt-  ) 
Let M =  EMt be the unconditional  mean  of Mt. Using  Xt =  -GK  +  1 + 
(AKt/Kt,_), Ct/Pt, =  1 -  (1 -  8)EtMt+,,  and the definitions  of Kt and M, 
(4.11) becomes 
-Kt  (GK  -  1)(1-  GKM)  +  [+-1 -  0-1(1 -  8)M]  (K  -  1 
Kt-1  Kt 
AKt+l 
+ MGKEt K-  Ut,  (4.12) 
I<t 
where  -u,  -  -1(1  -  8)(M  -  EtMt+) [(OK/KtK)  -  1]  +  GKEt[(Mt+ 
- 
M)(AKt+1/Kt  -  GK  + 1)] + 0.5Et(Mt+lXt2+).  Equation (4.12) implies that the 
growth  rate of the  capital stock is a linearly increasing  function  of two 
variables:  the  percentage  gap  between  the  target  and  actual  capital 
stocks,  and the expected  growth  rate of the capital stock. Now  take the 
following  first-order approximation.  [See Abel and Blanchard (1986) for 
some  empirical  evidence  in  an  investment  context  supporting  an  ap- 
proximation  such  as the  one  about to be used.]  Note  that all the terms 
in  ut  are  the  products  of  random  variables  that  are  zero  in  the 
nonstochastic  steady  state,  and  so  will  be  small  when  the  system  is 
near the steady  state.  Next,  use  (Kt -  Kt_l)/Kt_  A In kt,  AKt, (OK/Kt) 
-  1 -  ln(Kt/Kt)  -  In 0 +  kt -  kt;  here and throughout  the paper, when 
upper-  and  lowercase  are  both  used,  the  lowercase  denotes  a  loga- 
rithm.  Finally, define  a  =  -  /[1  -  (1 -  8)M] and b  MGK.  We end  up 
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1 
Akt = constant  + -(k  +  -  kt) +  Etb  Akt+ -  et,  (4.13) 
a 
where  et collects  approximation  errors and terms assumed  to be small. 
5.  Q-Model 
Our empirical  work  on Q is conventional.  Define  Qt as the ratio of the 
marginal value of capital to the price of capital. Given constant returns to 
scale,  such  as  is  assumed  in  the  model  in  the  previous  section,  the 
marginal value  of capital [defined  as the right-hand  side  of (4.9) in the 
model  of the previous  section] is equal to its average value (see Hayashi, 
1982).  Thus  under  a  standard  set  of  assumptions  about  stock-market 
behavior,  Qt can be measured  as Tobin's Q, the ratio of the stock-market 
valuation  of capital to the replacement  cost of capital. 
Apart from deterministic  terms, the regressions  actually run were 
It/Kt =  yQt-,  +  disturbance,  (5.1) 
or It/Kt  =  yQt +  disturbance,  possibly  with  a correction for first-order 
serial correlation.  Here,  Qt-1 is Q at the end of period t -  1 (beginning  of 
period  t). 
6. Flexible  Accelerator  Model 
In this section we derive the equations used in the main part of our empiri- 
cal work. The investment  first-order condition that we begin with was pre- 
sented  in equation  (4.13) of the general equilibrium model  of Section 4. 
But since we do not wish to tie ourselves inflexibly to that model, we make 
a self-contained  presentation  here.12 Our dynamic,  logarithmic  imple- 
mentation  is similar in spirit though  not in all detail to that of the familiar 
Hall-Jorgenson  (1967) approach to investment  as implemented  by Clark 
(1979) and many  other authors.  A representative  firm minimizes 
00 
0.5Et >  bi[(k*t+j  -  kt+j)2  +  a(kt+j  - 
kt+j1  )2 + 2kt+jet+j],  (6.1) 
j=0 
t =  Yt -  c,.  (6.2) 
12. Among  the  features  of  our  empirical  work  not  suggested  by  the  model:  we  obtain 
discount  factors  from  observed  rates  of  return  on  financial  assets  rather  than  in- 
tertemporal marginal rates of substitution; we allow multiple rather than single shocks; 
we  have  stochastic  rather than deterministic  trends. 298 - KIYOTAKI  & WEST 
In (6.1),  Et is  mathematical  expectation,  using  data as  of  period  t, as- 
sumed  equivalent  to linear projections,  0 < b <  1 is a discount factor, kt 
In Kt  is the log of the capital stock at the end of period t, kt  In K: is the 
log  of  the  target capital  stock,  which  would  obtain  in  a  deterministic 
steady  state,  et is a stationary  cost shock observable  to the firm but not 
the econometrician,  and  a is a positive  parameter that reflects the rela- 
tive  importance  of costs  of being  away  from Kt and  of adjustment.  In 
(6.2), Yt  =  In(output) and ct = ln(cost of capital): the underlying  technol- 
ogy  is  Cobb-Douglas.  Inessential  constants  have  been  omitted  from 
(6.1) and (6.2) for clarity.13 
Upon  differentiating  (6.1) with respect to kt, we obtain equation (4.13), 
and familiar manipulations  lead to 
A  x  A  X0 
kt = Akt1 + -  (bA)Etkt*+j  -  . 
(bA)Etet+j,  (6.3)  a j=0  a j=0 
whence 
k,  -k  =  A(kt  -  0-  l-)-  +  (1  -  A)  (bAE  --E  (byE  (6.4)00 
j=o  a  j= 
In (6.3), 0 < A <  1 is the smaller root of the equation baA2  -  (1 + a + ba)A 
+  a  =  0, and we  derive  (6.4) from (6.3) using  A/a =  (1 -  A)(1 -  bA). We 
turn to (6.4) from  (6.3) to have  a decision  rule in terms of a stationary 
variable: in our data,  the percentage  deviation  of capital from its target 
value,  kt -  kt,  and the growth  rate of target capital, Akt, arguably might 
be  well  modeled  as  stationary,  possibly  around  a one-time  change  in 
mean in 1974; rapidly growing  variables like kt  and kt -  Yt  will not. 
To solve  (6.4) for the implied process for kt -  k*,  let ft denote a vector of 
variables that are useful in forecasting future Akt's, including at least two 
of Ak*,  Ayt, and Act-say  Akt and Act for concreteness.  (Given Akt = Ayt - 
Act, and  our use  of linear models,  all results  are identical when  we  use 
any two  of Akt, Ayt, and Act.) Let Zt =  (kt -  kt, f)'.  Through most of the 
work ft contains  no variables in addition  to Akt and Act, and Zt is 3 x  1. 
We have 
kt-k*=A(kt- _-kt-*)-E  [Ak-(1-A)  (bA)Ak+jZt-l,Zt-2,  .  .  lt,  (6.5) 
j=0 
13. Nickell  (1979) also suggested  a log-linear flexible accelerator model. Business  Fixed  Investment  and  the  Recent  Business  Cycle  in Japan  *  299 
lt  Vlt  -  (A/a)0=o(bAYEtet+j,  vlt  E[Akt  -  (1  -  A)2  o(bAY  Ak+jIZt-', 
Zt-2,  .  .  -  Et[Ak  t -  (1 -  A)E_  0(bA)j  Ak,+]. We assume that lagged Zt's  are 
part of the  firm's information  set,  which  means  that v1t  is uncorrelated 
with  lags of Z,. We assume  as well  that et is also uncorrelated with  these 
lags,  and that Elt is serially uncorrelated.  A process for Zt consistent  with 
(6.5) is a VAR, say 
Zt  =  I7Zt-1  +  E,.  (6.6) 
Equation (6.6) assumes  a VAR (1) because  that is maintained  in most  of 
our empirical work.  Generalization  to higher-order VARs is routine. 
We obtain  unrestricted  estimates  of (6.6) by OLS. We obtain estimates 
that are restricted  to follow  the  decision  rule implied  by (6.5) by solving 
for  a  H  consistent  with  (6.5).  Details  on  the  procedure  are  given  in 
Section  7.3 and  the  Appendix.  Given  a set  of restricted or unrestricted 
estimates  of (6.6), most of the analysis is concerned  with the coefficients 
and  residuals  in the  corresponding  unit root VAR in the  levels  of y,  c, 
and k (and,  in systems  in which ft includes  a variable in addition  to Ak* 
and  Ac, in the level  of the additional  variable as well).  We solve  for the 
short- and long-run  elasticities  of capital with  respect to output  and the 
cost of capital (also known  as dynamic  multipliers,  or impulse  response 
functions).  We also compute  the 1986 forecast of the 1991 values  of kt, k*, 
Yt,  and ct, and similarly the 1991 forecast of the 1994 values.  We then use 
the  actual realized  values  to compute  the  surprise  components,  which 
are simply  the  differences  between  forecast and actual. We further ob- 
tain an orthogonal  decomposition  of the surprise components  into those 
due  to  shocks  to  the  variables  in ft, and  a residual,  uncorrelated,  "kt 
shock,"  as follows.  To do  so,  we  use  the VAR in the levels  of the vari- 
ables,  and  apply  a Choleski  decomposition  with  the  residual  for k or- 
dered last. 
7.  Data and Estimation  Technique  for Investment 
Regressions 
The capital stock Kt (kt  In Kt  for the flexible accelerator) is as described 
in Section 2 above.  Throughout  this section,  P,t refers to the deflator for 
private investment  in plant and equipment.  Because of a possible  change 
in regime around  1974, all specifications  were estimated  both on the full 
sample  and on a sample  that began in 1974. The full-sample  regressions 
always  included  a constant  and post-1973 dummy,  the post-1973 ones  a 
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7.1 Q-REGRESSIONS 
Gross  investment  [the  numerator  of  the  left-hand  side  of  (5.1)]  was 
computed  by deflating  the sectoral nominal  gross investment  figure by 
the deflator for private investment  in plant and equipment.  In most  of 
the regressions  reported below, 
denominator  of Q =  nominal  value of net fixed assets,  (7. la) 
own  equity value  +  debt 
numerator of Q  =  (inventories  + land  (7.  b) 
+cross-holding  of equities 
+monetary  assets)  -  rAt, 
where  rt is the effective  corporate tax rate, and At is the expected  present 
value of depreciation  of past investments.  Construction of 7t  is discussed 
in Section  7.2; of At, at the end of this section.  For 1961-1968,  the equity 
value  was  constructed  working  backwards  from the  1969 value,  using 
the balance-sheet  figures on net acquisitions and the Topix index. All the 
other  items  in  (7.1) were  obtained  directly from nominal  quantities  on 
the balance  sheet.  In some  regressions  we  lumped  inventories  with  net 
fixed assets.  In that case,  (7. la) was changed  so that nominal inventories 
were added  to net fixed assets,  and (7. lb) was changed  so that the value 
of inventories  was not subtracted out. 
Figure 3a depicts  I/K.  Figures 3b and  c depict  Q when  capital is de- 
fined  as in  most  of this  paper,  to consist  of net  fixed  assets,  and  next 
when  the definition  is broadened  to include  inventories.  There is a sug- 
gestion  of a downward  movement  in the early part of the sample,  which 
is good  news  for Q-theory given  the broadly parallel downward  move- 
ment in I/K. The bad news  is that Q is almost always negative in the basic 
specification,  reflecting  a  negative  numerator  in  equation  (7.1b).  One 
possible  problem  is  that throughout  the  sample,  there is mismeasure- 
ment  of equities  caused  by  use  of book  value  of equity  for nontraded 
corporations  (see  Section  3); Hoshi  and  Kashyap  (1990) find  that  this 
biases  Q downwards  in Japanese  data.14 Another  possible  problem  is 
mismeasurement  of the value  of land  (see  Section  3), overstatement  of 
which  would  lower  the  numerator  of Q. In our empirical work  we  do 
not,  however,  attempt to correct for such mismeasurement. 
Some  details  on construction  of the present  value of future deprecia- 
14. The problem  does,  however,  seem  to run deeper  than measurement  of equity at book 
rather than market. Hoshi  and Kashyap  (1990) find that a substantial fraction of firms 
with  equity valued  at market have Q < 0, even  after making a careful calculation of the 
market value  of land. Business Fixed Investment  and the Recent Business Cycle in Japan  *  301 
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tion deductions  At, which  may be skipped  without  loss of continuity:  A 
precise  definition  of At may be found  in, e.g.,  Hayashi  (1990). For 1961- 
1981, we  set At =  (denominator  of Qt) x  [Homma et al.'s (1984, Table 3- 
1) figure  for A]/[Homma  et al.'s  (1984,  Table 3-1) figure  for net  fixed 
assets].  (Homma  et al.  use  Japanese  manufacturing  data.)  For  1982- 
1994,  we  relied  on  Iwamoto  (1989),  who  shows  that  under  certain 
assumptions, 
(7.3) 
where  a is the percentage  depreciation  per year, set to 0.09, and it is the 
safe nominal  interest  rate, set to the fourth-quarter holding  yield  of the 
long-term  bonds  of NTT, the national telephone  company. 
7.2  DATA FOR FLEXIBLE  ACCELERATOR  REGRESSIONS 
For Yt,  we use the log of the output  of industry, as described in Section 2 
above. The cost of capital ct used in the regressions  is the log of a conven- 
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ItQ  .  c(7.4)  Ct =  CltC2t  (7.4) 
1  -  TtZt  Et[Pit+x/Pit](1  -  a) 
1-  rt  1+  iat 
In (7.4),  rt is  the  effective  corporate  tax rate, zt is the  present  value  of 
depreciation  deductions  per  dollar of  new  investment;  PYt  is the  price 
of  output,  measured  as  the  deflator  for output  of industry,  1985=100; 
Et[P t+1/PIt] is  the  fitted  value  of  an  AR(1)  in  PI  t+,/Pt;  8 is  the  deprecia- 
tion  rate,  set  at  0.10,  which  is  approximately  the  depreciation  rate 
implied  by  the  balance-sheet  data; and  1 +  iat  is the nominal  discount 
factor for the  firm.  Some  details  on  T, z, and  ia are given  at the  end  of 
this section.  It may help to note that C2t  is usually approximated  as15 
C2t  . iat -  expected  inflation  in  Pi,  +  8. 
Figure 4a plots  the level  Ct =exp(ct)  of the cost of capital. As suggested 
by the Figure 4b plot of PIt/Pyt  (the ratio of the price of investment  goods 
to that of output),  the  downward  trend in the cost of capital is largely 
attributable to a secular fall in this ratio. As indicated in Figure 4c and d, 
there is no trend apparent either in the tax factors in the Clt  term or in the 
real interest-rate  terms  collected  in  C2t. The latter terms  do,  however, 
have sharp cyclical effects. The spikes in C2t  and hence in Ct  during 1972- 
1975 are caused  by  violent  movements  in actual and  thus  in expected 
inflation: from 1972 through  1975 actual inflation in P,t was  (in percent) 
3.0,  12.5, 23.7,  4.9,  while  expected  inflation  was  2.6,  8.1,  14.5, 3.7.  The 
downward  trend,  as well  as  the  volatility  around  the  time  of the  first 
OPEC  shock,  is  also  found  in  the  cost  of  capital  series  presented  in 
Tajika, Hayashi,  and Abrai (1987). Figures 4a and 5 show  that the blip in 
C around  1974-1975  is transmitted  to k* and thus to k* -  k. 
Some  details  on taxes and the nominal  discount  factor, which  may be 
skipped  without  loss of continuity: 
7.2.1  Taxes  All  tax rates are statutory  maximums,  and were  obtained 
from various editions  of the Ministry of Finance's Schematic  Explanation  of 
Japanese  Taxes. Let rc  be the corporate tax rate on retained earnings,  Tg  the 
15. A number of studies  since Clark (1979) have computed  expected  inflation from output 
rather than capital-goods  prices. The capital-goods  inflation rate is appropriate not only 
in the model in Section  4, but, more  generally,  in "putty-putty"  models in which firms 
are viewed as renting  capital  period  by period at the market  price  of capital.  See Ando 
et al. (1974). Business Fixed Investment  and the Recent Business Cycle in Japan  ?  303 
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enterprise  tax rate,  r1 the  local  tax rate.  Let 1  +  is, be  a safe  nominal 
interest rate, computed  as the annual average of monthly  call rates. Then 
'  =  [r,(1  +  i')  +  'g]  [(1  +  is,)/(1 +  is, +  rg)]; the second  factor in brackets 
allows  for the  deductibility  of  the  enterprise  tax against  next  period's 
income  (see  Hayashi,  1990). Because  of the absence  of data on the split 
between  structures  and  machinery,  the  present  value  of  depreciation 
deductions  (zt) was fixed at 0.562 for all t; 0.562 is the 1961-1981 average 
of the {zj series given in Hayashi  (1990, p. 308), who  studies manufactur- 
ing firms. 
This tax measure  ignores  a host  of what we hope  are minor complica- 
tions.  Readers familiar with  the U.S.  investment  literature may wonder 
at the absence  of reference  to the investment  tax credits; Hayashi  (1990), 
however,  states  that  these  are of  small  magnitude  in  Japan. We also 
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Figure 5 k (SOLID), k* = y -  c (DASHED) 
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ignore, for example,  special tax treatment of dividends  received by corpo- 
rations,  the  existence  of  certain  tax-free reserves,  special  capital gains 
taxes on land,  and periods  of "special depreciation." 
7.2.2  Nominal Discount Factor  We set  iat =  (1 -  o)(expected  net nomi- 
nal return  on  equity  from  t to  t +  1) +  co(1 -  r)(net  nominal  rate on 
debt),  where  co  is the share of debt financing.  We set oa =  0.6,  which  is 
roughly  consistent  with  the  average  debt/equity  and  net-worth  ratios 
for  nonfinancial  corporations  for  the  whole  sample  (see  Ando  and 
Auerbach,  1990).  The  expected  return  on  equity  was  assumed  to  be 
the  nominal  return  on  safe  government  debt  plus  a constant  risk pre- 
mium.  The annual  average  of call rates was  used  for the  safe nominal 
rate. The  constant  risk premium  was  set at 0.05,  which  is the  average 
annualized  excess  return  of  Topix  over  the  call  rate,  using  either 
monthly  data  1970-1995  or  semiannual  (March and  September)  data 
1961-1995.  The  nominal  rate  on  debt  was  set  equal  to  the  annual 
average  of  the  business  borrowing  rate  described  in  Section  2  and 
plotted  in Figure 2c. 
A  small  amount  of experimentation  at a preliminary  stage  of the re- 
search for this paper suggested  that the results would  not be sensitive  to 
the  assumed  risk premium  for equity,  the  assumed  depreciation  rate, 
and the use  of annual averages  rather than end-of-year  values  for inter- 
est rates. 
7.3 ESTIMATION  TECHNIQUE  FOR  FLEXIBLE 
ACCELERATOR  REGRESSIONS 
In unrestricted  regressions,  estimates  were  obtained  by  OLS, and  the 
usual  OLS standard errors are reported.  For restricted regressions,  esti- 
mates of the kt -  kt equation were obtained  with a numerical technique, 
and  inference  conducted  using  a bootstrap  technique.  Details  on both 
estimation  and  inference  are in the  Appendix.  With respect  to estima- 
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1.  We did not estimate  but instead  imposed  an annual  discount  factor, 
setting  b = 0.95.16 
2.  To obtain restricted estimates,  we used a two-step  procedure that un- 
der conventional  econometric  assumptions  is consistent  but not effi- 
cient. In a first step,  we obtained consistent  estimates of a and A from 
the unrestricted estimates.  In a second step, we used an iterative proce- 
dure to solve  for a kt -  kt process  compatible  with  these  values  and 
with the unrestricted coefficients in the equations forft. [Recall thatft is 
the vector of variables used  to forecast future Akt's, ft =  (Ak,  Act)' in 
our basic specification.]  This iterative procedure takes proper account 
of the Granger causality from k -  k* to Ak*. (Without such causality, 
one  could of course directly compute,  without  iterating, a restricted k 
-  k* process.)  Note that since restricted and unrestricted coefficients in 
the Ak*  and Ac equations are the same, so, too, are the coefficients and 
residuals  in the equations  for the levels  of y and c. 
3.  We leave unrestricted  all coefficients  on deterministic  terms. 
With respect  to our bootstrap  inference: 95% confidence  intervals  for 
regression  parameters  and impulse  responses  were obtained by sorting 
1000 sets  of estimates  from lowest  to highest  and dropping  the smallest 
and largest 25. A bootstrap p-value of a test of the cross-equation  restric- 
tions was obtained by comparing the actual value of the test statistic with 
the  1000 values  computed  in  the  bootstrap.  The  test  statistic  was  the 
difference  between  the logarithms  of the determinants  of the variance- 
covariance matrices of the restricted and unrestricted residuals. 
8.  Results  for Q-Regressions 
Table 6 presents  the results  of the regression  (5.1). Columns  (1) and (3) 
report results  when  beginning  of period  Q is used,  for both  the whole 
and  the post-1973  sample.  Since the diagnostics  reported at the foot of 
the table suggested  substantial serial correlation, estimates with a correc- 
tion for first-order serial correlation are reported in columns 2 and 4. The 
results are not encouraging.  In addition  to substantial serial correlation, 
the coefficient  on Q is generally wrong-signed  and is far from significant 
at conventional  levels  in  the  one  specification  in  which  it is  correctly 
signed  [column  (2)]. The regressions  with  end-of-period  Q [columns  (5) 
and (6)] and when  capital is defined  to include  inventories  [columns  (7) 
and (8)] are equally unsupportive. 
16. The growth  model  of Section 4 suggests  computing  b from the average value of 1 -  C2t 
[C2t is defined  in (7.4)] and the growth  rate of the capital stock.  If we  do so using  the 
data described  in the Section 7, however,  we get b =  1.03. Table 6  REGRESSION RESULTS, Q-MODEL 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Regressor  and  1962-94  1963-94  1974-94  1975-94  1961-94  1974-94  1962-94  1963-94 
Summary  Statistic  (33 obs.)  (32 obs.)  (21 obs.)  (20 obs.)  (34 obs.)  (21 obs.)  (33 obs.)  (32 obs.) 
Qt-i  -0.008  0.008  -0.077  -0.024 
(0.035)  (0.025)  (0.010)  (0.019) 
Qt  -0.019  -0.067 
(0.032)  (0.023) 
Qt-l with  -0.004  0.016 
inventories  (0.039)  (0.029) 
Constant  0.252  0.196  0.139  0.155  0.251  0.143  0.254  0.199 
(0.008)  (0.036)  (0.004)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.015)  (0.032) 
post-1973  -0.087  -0.027  -0.090  -0.087  -0.028 
dummy  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.016) 
p  0.911  0.666  0.905 
(0.080)  (0.161)  (0.084) 
~R~2  ~  0.784  0.900  0.336  0.573  0.797  0.257  0.784  0.901 
S.e.e.  0.022  0.015  0.013  0.010  0.022  0.013  0.022  0.015 
Q-statistic  24.31  15.15  6.81  10.70  25.33  5.45  24.82  14.80 
[p-value]  [0.00]  [0.03]  [0.24]  [0.03]  [0.00]  [0.36]  [0.00]  [0.04] 
Durbin-Watson  0.73  1.19  1.08  0.74  0.73  0.89  0.72  1.19 
Notes: 
1.  The table presents  the results of ordinary least-squares  regression  estimates  in columns  (1), (3), (5), (6), and (7), with heteroscedasticity  and autocorrelation 
consistent  standard errors computed  using  four lags of the estimator  suggested  in Newey  and West (1987). Columns  (2), (4), and (8) present  estimates  using  a 
Cochrane-Orcutt  correction  for first-order  serial  correlation,  with  the  row  labeled  p presenting  the  resulting  estimate  of  the  first-order  serial correlation 
coefficient.  For description  of summary  statistics,  see notes  to Table 7 below. 
2.  In all columns,  the dependent  variable is the ratio of real (1985 yen)  gross investment  in a given  year to the end-of-the-year  capital stock,  for nonfinancial 
corporations.  Q is measured  at the  end  of  the  year,  so  Qt-l  is beginning  of  period  Q.  "Q with  inventories"  combines  inventories  and  fixed  capital.  All 
measures  of Q are adjusted  for taxes.  See text for further details. Business  Fixed  Investment  and  the  Recent  Business  Cycle  in Japan  ?  307 
Given  the wildly  unsatisfactory  nature of these  results,  and the more 
fundamental  problem that Q is negative for most of our sample (see Figure 
3), we  decided  not to attempt to refine or interpret these  estimates. 
9.  Results  for Flexible  Accelerator  Regressions 
9.1 MEANS  OF BASIC  VARIABLES 
Table 7 presents  means  and  standard  deviations  of the basic variables, 
for the annual intervals corresponding  to those presented  in Table 1. The 
pattern for the capital stock k and for output of industry is a familiar one, 
with robust growth before 1973 followed  by more moderate growth after 
1974,  and  with  the  1986-1991  period  relatively  strong,  the  1991-1994 
period  exceptionally  weak.  As indicated  in Figure 4, the cost of capital c 
fell through most of the period,  especially in the early part of the sample. 
The  column  (3) and  (4) subperiod  figures  for this  variable are heavily 
Table  7  GROWTH  RATES  AND STANDARD  DEVIATIONS  OF 
CAPITAL  STOCK  AND SOME  RELATED  VARIABLES, 
SELECTED  SUBPERIODS 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1962-94  1961-73  1973-94  1973-91  1986-91  1991-94 
(1) k  8.0  12.7  5.3  5.7  6.5  3.0 
(4.4)  (3.7)  (1.5)  (1.1)  (0.9)  (1.4) 
(2)  k*  y -  c  7.9  17.2  3.0  2.5  7.2  5.9 
(16.8)  (7.9)  (18.2)  (19.7)  (4.1)  (3.2) 
(3) y  5.7  9.5  3.5  4.1  5.5  0.1 
(3.8)  (2.5)  (2.4)  (2.0)  (1.1)  (1.0) 
(4)  c  -2.3  -7.6  0.5  1.6  -1.8  -5.8 
(16.1)  (9.3)  (18.3)  (19.7)  (3.5)  (2.5) 
(5)  p, -  py  -1.8  -2.8  -1.2  -1.0  -1.2  -2.6 
(1.9)  (1.6)  (1.8)  (1.9)  (0.9)  (0.4) 
(6)  cl  0.0  -0.1  0.1  0.1  -1.5  -0.1 
(1.5)  (0.9)  (1.8)  (1.9)  (1.4)  (0.1) 
(7)  c2  -0.5  -4.7  1.6  2.4  0.9  -3.2 
(16.5)  (9.5)  (19.1)  (20.5)  (4.5)  (2.7) 
Notes: 
1.  The  data are annual  and  real (1985 yen).  Growth  rates are computed  by averaging  log differences 
beginning  with  the  year  following  the  start date;  the  column  (6) figure,  for example,  averages  log 
differences  in the 3 years from 1992 to 1994. k is net fixed assets of nonfinancial corporations, y is output 
of industry,  c is the cost of capital, constructed  as described in the text and note 2 below.  In columns  (1) 
and (2), the sample  periods  for k and y begin  in 1961 rather than 1962. Because of this,  and because  of 
rounding,  rows  (3) and (4) may not add to row (2). See text for further details. 
2.  The cost of capital in row (4) is the product of the three terms in rows (5) through (7). Row (5) is the 
ratio of deflator  for private investment  in plant and equipment  to that for output  of industry.  Row (6) 
reflects tax factors. Row (7) largely reflects a nominal discount  factor and expected  inflation. See the text 
for details.  Rows  (5) to  (7) may  not  add  to row  (4) because  of rounding.  See  text for further details. 308 - KIYOTAKI  & WEST 
influenced  by  the  fact  that  the  sample  starts  in  1973 (see  Figure  4a); 
moving  the  starting  date  to  1975  would  result  in  negative  average 
growth  rates. 
It may be seen  in column  (1), rows (1) and (2) that the growth rates of 
capital  and  of  the  target  level  of  capital  k* are quite  similar  over  the 
entire  sample  period,  despite  the  growing  capital-to-output  ratio [col- 
umn  (1), row (1) vs.  column  (1), row (3)]. We note that this is consistent 
with  the  model  of  Section  4,  and  with  the  less  structured  Cobb- 
Douglas  specification  of target capital in Section  6. Our empirical work 
does  not,  however,  rely  on  the  Section  4 prediction  that  the  capital- 
output  ratio will increase  indefinitely:  The point is that simple  statistics 
such as in Table 7, plots  such as Figures 4 and 5, and conventional  unit- 
root tests  (details  omitted)  do suggest  that the unit-root specification  in 
the cost of capital and the capital-output  ratio, as well  as cointegration 
between  actual and  target capital, reasonably  characterize the behavior 
in our sample. 
Rows  (5) to (7) of Table 7 further decompose  the growth in the cost of 
capital. Column  (1) indicates  that over the whole  sample,  the fall in the 
cost  of capital is basically  attributable to the fall in the relative price of 
new  capital goods  to output  [line (5)]. In the boom  of 1986-1991,  how- 
ever,  the  fall is also  attributable to tax factors [line (6), column  (5)]; the 
main event  here was a series of cuts in the corporate tax rate from 43.3% 
in 1986 to 37.5% in 1990 and  1991. In the 1991-1994  period,  falls in the 
relative price and in the real interest-rate term [line (7)] were both impor- 
tant.  The latter reflects  the general  fall in interest  rates associated  with 
the Bank of Japan's interest-rate cuts; see Figure 2c above. 
Table 7 indicates  that at least the secular movement  in the capital stock 
is consistent  with the secular movement  in output and the cost of capital. 
To analyze  cyclical dynamics,  we turn to regression  analysis. 
9.2 REGRESSION  ANALYSIS 
9.2.1  Unrestricted  Regressions  Table 8 presents  VAR estimates,  obtained 
by OLS. As a preliminary, columns  (la)  and (lb)  present  a very simple 
specification,  a bivariate VAR in (k -  k*, Ak*).  The t-statistics implied by 
the column  (lb)  figures  indicate  that relative to an information  set con- 
sisting  of  past  k -  k*'s and  past  Ak*'s,  k -  k* Granger-causes  Ak* even 
though  Ak*  does  not Granger-cause itself; on average,  a 1% (say) excess 
of k over  k* is associated  with  Ak* rising by about  0.5% the  next  year. 
Columns  (2a) through  (2c) add Ac to the VAR. Column  (2c) indicates 
that k -  k*  helps  predict not only Ak*  but one of its components,  Ac, with 
a 1% (say) excess  of k over k* on average being  followed  with Ac falling 
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column  (2b) suggest  that it helps to include both Ak_1  and Act,_  as predic- 
tors of Akt; column  (2c) suggests  the same,  a little more mildly. 
Columns  (3a) through  (3c) add a second  lag of each of the three vari- 
ables k -  k*, Ak*, and Ac. While individual  t-statistics are small, both F- 
tests  and  t-tests  on the  sum  of the coefficients  on k -  k* strongly  reject 
the null that k -  k* does  not help predict Ak*  and Ac. 
Finally, columns  (4a) and  (4c) present  results  when  the sample  is re- 
stricted to 1974-94.  Once again, rises in k -  k*  anticipate rises in Ak*  and 
falls in Ac [columns  (4b) and (4c)]. 
In the three specifications  (2)-(4),  point estimates  sometimes  look dif- 
ferent.  We therefore  began  the  analysis  using  all three.  In this prelimi- 
nary  analysis,  all  three  proved  to  yield  quite  similar  answers  to  the 
questions  we  ask (see Table 10 below),  indicating that from the perspec- 
tive of the VAR in (y, c, k) many  of the shifts in coefficients  observed  in 
Table 8 are offsetting.  So for parsimony  and computational  simplicity we 
focused  on the one-lag  specifications  in columns  (2) and (4). We repeated 
all estimates  with  both  samples,  although  for conciseness  in reporting 
results we  generally  give more detailed  attention  to the full-sample  esti- 
mates in column  (2). 
9.2.2  Impulse Response Functions  To  interpret  these  full-sample  esti- 
mates,  we solve for the restricted kt -  kt process using the method  in the 
Appendix  and then,  using  k* = y -  c, transform to a unit-root VAR in (y, 
c, k). Apart from deterministic  terms and the residual,  the result is 
yt =  0.015kt  +  1.172yt  _  -  0.187yt_2  + 0.033ct,l  -  0.018ct2,  (9.la) 
(-0.054,  0.092)  (0.730,  1.42) (-0.436,  0.242)  (-0.027,  0.105) (-0.084,  0.048) 
ct =  -  0.477kt_1  -  1.406yt_l  +  1.883yt_2  +  0.582ct_1  -  0.059ct_2,  (9.lb) 
(-0.884,  -0.228)  (-3.71,  1.42) (0.488, 4.06) (0.206, 0.881) (-0.423,  0.220) 
k,  =  0.953kt,  +  0.294yt,_  -  0.247y,_2  -  0.048c,_1  +  O.O000t2,  (9.1c) 
(0.892,  1.012) (0.040, 1.36) (-1.35,  -0.025)  (-0.146,  -0.007)  (-0.031,  0.112) 
a=  15.17,  A=  0.79.  (9.1d) 
(1.15, 92.3)  (0.41, 0.92) 
In parentheses  are 95% confidence  intervals,  from a bootstrap. 
In the y and c equations,  the confidence  intervals on the estimates  of 
the coefficients  on kt 1 suggest  that the Granger causality found in Table 8 
reflects  a systematic  tendency  for movements  in k to anticipate  move- 
ments  in c but perhaps  not y. [Asymptotic  standard errors (not reported) 
suggest  the same.]  In (9.1d), the confidence  intervals around a and A are 
large. The point  estimates  of these  two parameters,  which  suggest  con- 310 * KIYOTAKI  & WEST 
Table 8  REGRESSION RESULTS, FLEXIBLE  ACCELERATOR  MODEL 
Regressor  Dependent  Variable 
and 
Summary  (la)  (lb)  (2a)  (2b)  (2c) 
Statistic  kt -  kt  Ak  kt -  k  Ak  Act 
0.428  0.523  0.452  0.492  -0.477 
(0.160)  (0.162)  (0.156)  (0.153)  (0.165) 
-0.093  0.083  -1.630  2.070  -1.883 
(0.171)  (0.174)  (0.967)  (0.951)  (1.021) 
-1.570  2.029  -1.824 
(0.973)  (0.957)  (1.028) 
-1.071  1.114  -0.878  0.865  -0.758 
(0.283)  (0.288)  (0.300)  (0.296)  (0.317) 
0.183  -0.254  0.087  -0.128  0.074 
























2.32  2.40 
1964-94  (31 obs.) 
1.96  2.02 
1964-94  (31 obs.) 
Notes: 
1.  The table presents  the results of ordinary least- squares estimates  of the vector autoregressions  with 
the  indicated  variables.  Asymptotic  standard  errors are in  parentheses.  "S.e.e."  is  the  degrees-of- 
freedom-adjusted  estimated  of  the  standard  deviation  of  the regression  disturbance.  The number  of 
degrees  of freedom  in the  Q-statistic is 8 in specifications  1-3,  5 in specification  4. The sample  period 
that is given  is for the dependent  variable. 
2.  k(t) is the log of the capital stock, c(t) the log of the cost of capital, and k*(t)  the target level of capital, 
defined  as the difference  between  log of output  and c(t). See text for further discussion. 
3.  The capital stock k is for nonfinancial  corporations,  the output  y is the output  of industry,  and the 
cost of capital c was constructed  as described  in the text. All variables are real (1985 prices). 
k_  -  k*  t-1  t-l 
kt  -  k*  t-2  ^t-2 
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Table 8 (continued) 
(4a) 
kt -  k* 
0.496 
(0.178) 
-2.767  3.239 
(1.273)  (1.251) 
-2.777  3.260 
(1.305)  (1.284) 
-0.677  0.645 
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siderable  persistence  in k, directly reflect the smooth  evolution  of k de- 
spite  some  sharp movements  in c and y. These  estimates  seem  roughly 
comparable  to estimates  of some  U.S.  studies.17 In the k-equation (9.1c), 
the coefficients  on the first lag of y and of c each are significantly  differ- 
ent  from zero  at the  5% level.  These  coefficients  indicate  that,  histori- 
cally, a 1% rise in output  has been  associated  with  about a 0.3% rise in 
the  next  year's  capital  stock,  and  that a corresponding  increase  in the 
cost of capital has been associated  with a 0.05% fall. The larger short-run 
elasticity with  respect to output was also found  in Yoshikawa (1995). 
To consider  longer-term  multipliers,  we  solve  for the moving-average 
representation.  In Figure 6, the solid line plots the first 10 of the moving- 
average  weights  (impulse  responses),  the  dashed  lines  the  95% boot- 
strap confidence  intervals.18 These  are not responses  to orthogonalized 
innovations,  but to the actual disturbances  in the (y, c, k) VAR. The top 
row presents  responses  of k, with the responses  for y and c included  on 
the next two rows.  Note that the scale of the c response  is different from 
that for k and y.  Since k -  k*  k -  (y -  c) is stationary, the long-run 
response  of k to  a given  shock  is  equal  to the  difference  between  the 
long-run y and c responses.  The plots stop at 10 periods because the long 
run is effectively  reached at this horizon. 
The  plot  in  the  upper  left-hand  corner shows  that a 1% shock  to y 
leads  dynamically  to monotonic  increases  in k that asymptote  at 0.55%. 
[The long run is not 1%, because this plot takes account of the reaction of 
all the variables in the system  to the increase in y. Such a shock tends  to 
lead to not a 1% but a 1.14% long-run  increase in y (leftmost plot in the 
second  row),  and  a 0.58% long-run  increase  in c (leftmost  plot  in  the 
bottom  row).]  A  1% shock  to c leads  ultimately  to a  -0.07%  fall in k. 
What explains  the stronger response  (larger elasticity) of k to shocks to 
y than to c? As noted  in the introduction,  because  our model has convex 
adjustment  costs,  it predicts  a smaller response  to shocks  to c, in both 
the short and the long run, if there is less persistence  (more mean rever- 
sion) in c: it would  not make sense  for a firm to rapidly cut back on k in 
response  to a rise in c if this rise were  likely to be swiftly  offset  with  a 
subsequent  fall.  And  c does  appear  to  be  less  persistent  than  y.  The 
figure indicates  that the long-run response  of c itself to a 1% shock to c is 
only  0.11%, in contrast  to  the  1.14% response  of y to its  own  shocks. 
17. Setting  M equal  to the  mean  of  1 -  C2t yields  k -  2.2.  [See (4.4),  (4.12),  and  (7.4).] 
Although  there are differences  in functional form and data frequency, this looks compa- 
rable to a value calibrated by Cogley  and Nason  (1995, p. 505). 
18. Slight  qualification:  The lower  end  of the  confidence  interval  on  the  one-step-ahead 
response  of c to a shock to y is -3.71;  for readability, the Figure 6 graph stops at -2.6. 
This is the only number truncated in the graphs. Figure 6 
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While  the  relevant  measure  of  mean  reversion  is the  multivariate  one 
depicted  in  the  figure,  this  mean  reversion  is  also  evident  in  the 
univariate c-process.  The first-order autocorrelations of Ac and its compo- 
nents  and of Ay are 
Ac  A(p  - py) Ac  Ac2 Ay 
1962-1994  -.17  .26  .14 -.22.64  (9.2) 
1974-1994  -.38  .14  .13 -.45  .46 
Thus,  the mean  reversion  observed  in Figure 6 apparently  is driven by 
mean  reversion  in c2, the interest-rate  component  of the cost of capital. 
In sum, then,  our model rationalizes three notable characteristics of the 
data: the growth of the capital-output  ratio, the apparently strong ability 
of k -  k* to predict Ak* and Ac, and the signs and relative magnitudes  of 
the elasticity of capital with respect to output and the cost of capital. 
9.2.3  Decomposition  of Forecast  Error  of the Capital  Stock  Table 9 presents  a 
decomposition  for the period  1986-1991,  and for 1991-1994,  computed 
from  the  estimates  in  equation  (9.1).  The  first column  in  each  panel 
repeats  the Table 7 figures  on realized annual growth  rates. The second 
column  presents  the  1986 and  1991 forecasts  from the  VAR, the  third 
column  the difference  between  actual and forecast. These  two columns 
do  not  exploit  an orthogonalization.  The last two  columns  rely on  the 
Choleski  factorization described above,  in which  residuals to the y and c 
equations  precede  that for the k-equation. Column (4) sums the effects of 
the y and  c shocks  (this sum  is independent  of whether  y or c appears 
first in the ordering),  while  column  (5) presents  the residual k-shock. 
Capital growth  was  stronger  than predicted  in 1986-1991,  weaker  in 
1991-1994.  But conditional  on the path of output and the cost of capital, 
much of this behavior is easily rationalized.  In both episodes,  about half 
the surprise in capital was  due to surprises in y and c, leaving  a residual 
surprise in k to account for the other half (2 -  0.89/1.79,  1.05/1.94) and for 
a smaller fraction of the actual movement. 
In 1991-1994,  it may  look  odd  that the  target capital k* was  slightly 
above  the  predicted  (=0.07),  while  innovations  in k* led  to a negative 
surprise in k (= -0.89).  This seems  to result from two factors. The first is 
that all of the good  news  in k* resulted  from a surprise fall in the cost of 
capital;  the  output  surprise  was  negative.  As  explained  above,  k re- 
sponds  more strongly to shocks to y than to c. Second,  much of the good 
news  in k* came in the last year of the three-year period; the 1991-1993 
forecast error in k* in fact was  negative  [-0.60%  (annualized)]. Business  Fixed  Investment  and  the  Recent  Business  Cycle  in Japan  *  315 
Table  9  DECOMPOSITION  OF FORECAST  ERROR  OF CAPITAL  STOCK 
Surprise 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Due to shock  to: 
Actual  Forecast  Total  y, c eqns.  k eqn. 
(a) 1986-1991 
(1)  k  6.47  4.68  1.79  0.90  0.89 
(2)  k*  y -  c  7.23  5.97  1.27  0.84  0.43 
(3)  y  5.47  3.48  2.00  1.99  0.01 
(4)  c  -1.76  -2.49  0.73  1.15  -0.42 
(b) 1991-1994 
(1)  k  2.97  4.92  -1.94  -0.89  -1.05 
(2)  k*  = y  -  c  5.92  5.84  0.07  0.30  -0.22 
(3)  y  0.10  3.57  -3.47  -3.46  -0.01 
(4)  c  -5.82  -2.27  -3.55  -3.76  0.21 
Notes: 
1.  See the note to Table 7 and the text for descriptions  of the data. All growth rates are annualized.  For 
example,  actual growth  of k for 1986-1991  was approximately 5 x  6.47%. Components  may not add up 
to a total because  of rounding. 
2.  The trivariate VAR whose  estimates  are presented  in equation  (9.1) was  used  to compute  the fore- 
casts of the levels  of the indicated  variables.  The decomposition  of the shock presented  in columns  (4) 
and (5) is obtained  by performing  a Choleski  decomposition  with the residual for k ordered last. 
9.2.4  Results for Alternative Specifications  Table 10 summarizes  impulse 
responses  and decompositions  of the 1986-1994 forecast error, for five ad- 
ditional specifications:  unrestricted  VARs with one lag and two lags, full 
sample and post-1973 sample (VAR  estimates for all but the two-lag, post- 
1973 sample  are in Table 8), and the restricted one-lag VAR for the post- 
1973 sample.  For ease  of comparison,  it also repeats results for the one- 
lag, restricted,  full-sample  VAR already reported in Figure 6 and Table 9. 
In a  nutshell,  the  results  already  presented  are quite  robust  to  the 
variations  in  specification  presented  in the table. In panels  (a) and  (b), 
the initial response  of k to a shock to y ranges from about 0.3% to 0.5%, 
and asymptotes  at around 0.6 to 0.9. The initial and long-run response  of 
a shock to c is negative  (apart from the initial response  in the full-sample, 
two-lag  specification)  and quite small algebraically. In panels  (c) and (d), 
the decompositions  attribute the lion's share of the movement  in k to the 
two components  of k* (again with the exception  of the full-sample,  two- 
lag VAR). 
Quantitative  consistency  between  the unrestricted and restricted esti- 
mates  is also  suggested  by the bootstrap  test of the restrictions.  The p- Table 10  RESULTS WITH ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
(a) Response  of k to a 1% Shock,  Full-Sample  Estimates 
Horizon  Restricted  Unrestricted  Unrestricted,  2 lags 
y  c  k  y  c  k  y  c  k 
2  .29  -.05  .95  .50  -.03  .94  .29  .00  1.41 
10  .55  -.07  .92  .80  -.08  .89  .80  -.09  .90 
(b) Response  of k to a 1% Shock, Post-1973-Sample  Estimates 
Horizon  Restricted  Unrestricted  Unrestricted,  2 lags 
y  c  k  y  c  k  y  c  k 
2  .40  -.04  .95  .51  -.03  .96  .39  -.01  1.11 
10  .71  -.05  .94  .81  -.04  .94  .85  -.06  .64 (c) Decomposition  of Forecast Error of kt, Full-Sample  Estimates 
Unrestricted  Unrestricted,  2 lags 
Surprise 
Total  y +  c  k 
Forecast  Surprise 
Total  y +  c  k 
Forecast  Surprise 
Total  y+  c  k 
1986-91  4.7  1.8  0.9  0.9  4.4  2.0  1.3  0.7  4.0  2.5  2.7  -0.2 
1991-94  4.9  -1.9  -0.9  -1.0  4.8  -1.8  -1.4  -0.4  4.8  -1.8  -2.9  1.1 
(d) Decomposition  of Forecast Error of kt, Post-1973 Estimates 
Restricted  Unrestricted  Unrestricted,  2 lags 
Forecast  Surprise  Forecast  Surprise  Forecast  Surprise 
Total  y+  c  k  Total  y + c  k  Total  y +  c  k 
1986-91  4.6  1.9  1.1  0.7  4.5  1.9  1.3  0.6  4.5  1.9  1.8  .2 
1991-94  4.9  -2.0  -1.3  -0.6  4.9  -1.9  -1.7  -0.3  4.5  -1.5  -1.6  .0 
Notes: 
1. See notes to Table  7 and the text for description  of the data. 
2. All estimates  are computed from trivariate  VARs  in (y, c, k). The "restricted"  estimates  in panels (a) and (c) are computed from  equation (9.1). The text 
does not directly  present the parameters  for the VARs  in (y, c, k)  for the other specifications  in the table, although  the parameters  in the underlying  VARs 
in (k -  k*,  Ak*,  Ac)  are in the following columns in Table  8: "unrestricted"  in panels (a) and (c), column (2);  "unrestricted"  in panels b and d, column (4); 
"unrestricted,  2 lag"  in panels (a)  and (c), column (3)  in Table  8. The "unrestricted,  2 lags"  estimates  in panels (b)  and (d) are  computed from  an underlying 
set of estimates  whose variables  are identical  to that in column  (3) of Table  8 except  that there is no post-1974  dummy. The "restricted"  estimates  in panels 
(b) and (d) are computed  by imposing the restrictions  as described  in the text. 
3. Panels  (a) and (b) present the response of k to a 1%  nonorthogonalized  shock to the indicated  variable.  See text for details. See notes to Table  9 for an 
explanation  of panels (c) and (d). 
4. The "restricted"  full-sample  estimates  repeat results depicted  in Figure  6(a) or Table  9(c). 
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value for this test was 0.654 for the whole  sample,  0.737 for the post-1973 
sample.19 
9.3 VARS  WITH  ADDITIONAL  VARIABLES 
We also  estimated  and  applied  three  additional  specifications,  each  of 
which  added  a  fourth  variable  to  the  system.  Our  motivations  were 
twofold.  First, it is possible  that sharper or more informative  estimates 
might  result,  insofar  as the  additional  variable helps  predict Ak*. Sec- 
ond,  according  to other investment  models,  a variable might  help  pre- 
dict capital accumulation  even  if it does  not help predict Ak*. 
The variable added  was  the yen-dollar  real exchange  rate, or real net 
worth  of  nonfinancial  corporations,  or real land  prices.  The exchange 
rate was  chosen  because  of the prominence  it plays in discussion  of the 
Japanese  economy,  both  generally  and  during  the  recent  cycle  (e.g., 
Economic Planning  Agency,  1994). Net worth was chosen  because of the 
role  it  plays  in  credit-constraint  models  such  as  Kiyotaki  and  Moore 
(1994,  1995).  Land prices  were  chosen  again because  of their value  as 
collateral in credit-constraint models  [see Ogawa et al. (1994) for an appli- 
cation  to  Japan],  and,  more  generally,  because  of  the  role  land  price 
fluctuations  may have played  in encouraging  speculative  behavior (e.g., 
Chirinko and Schaller, 1995). 
Each  variable  was  entered  as  a  log  difference.  [In the  notation  of 
Section 6, then, f =  (Ak*, Ac, Az)' and Z = (k -  k*, Ak*, Ac, Az)', where z 
is the log of the additional  variable.] We then estimated  unrestricted and 
restricted first-order VARs for the full and the post-1973 samples.  There 
were  few differences  between  the two samples,  so in Table 11 we report 
and discuss  only  the full-sample  results,  focusing  on impulse  responses 
and the 1986-1994  decomposition. 
In  Table 11,  columns  (2)-(4)  of  panel  (a) indicate  that  of  the  three 
variables,  only  the  real exchange  rate has  predictive  power  for k -  k*, 
Ak*, or Ac at traditional significance levels; a real exchange-rate apprecia- 
tion  is  associated  with  an  increase  in  Ak* and  a fall in c and  k -  k*. 
(Although  not reported in the table, in all three specifications  the coeffi- 
19. As suggested by the relative  size of these two p- values, bootstrap  confidence  intervals 
are generally larger for the post-1973 sample. This no doubt partly results from a 
smaller sample size, but may also indicate that the full-sample  intervals are a little 
misleading. In particular,  for the first-order  serial  correlation  coefficient  of the residual 
to the restricted equation for k, the point estimates and 95%  bootstrap confidence 
intervals  are 0.56 (-0.40,  0.28) for the full sample and 0.46 (-0.69,  0.77) for the post- 
1973 sample. Thus for the full sample there is evidence against the implicit  bootstrap 
assumption that the residuals are i.i.d. We take the similarity  of the results for all 
specifications in Table 10 to indicate that this mild serial correlation  has negligible 
economic importance. Table 11  RESULTS WITH ADDITIONAL  INFORMATION VARIABLES 
(a) Regression  Estimates 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
Variable  Coefficients  Response  of k to a 1% shock 
(z)  on Add'Variable 
Horizon  Unrestricted  VAR  Restricted  VAR 
kt -  k  Ak*  ACt  t  -t  Jt  ay 
c  z  k  Y  c  z  k 
eqn.  eqn.  eqn.  z  k 
Real  exch.  .62  -.61  .59  2  .49  -.04  .01  .94  .25  -.03  -.07  .97 
rate  (.22)  (.22)  (.24)  10  .74  -.06  -.06  .91  .27  -.02  -.12  .98 
Net worth  -.22  .32  .24  2  .34  -.04  .10  .94  .14  -.05  .09  .94 
(.33)  (.32)  (.37)  10  .16  -.09  .36  .88  .00  -.08  .30  .91 
Real land  .80  -.63  .59  2  .42  -.02  .16  .94  .30  -.07  -.16  .93 
price  (.49)  (.49)  (.53)  10  .86  -.05  .07  .91  .46  -.18  -.50  .81 
(b) Decomposition  of Forecast Error of kt 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Variable  Period  Unrestricted  VAR  Restricted VAR 
(z)  '(z)  Forecast  Surprise  Forecast  Surprise 
Total  Shocks to:  Total  Shocks  to: 
y+c+z  k  y+c+z  k 
Real exch.  1986-91  5.0  1.7  .9  .8  5.7  .8  .2  .6 
rate  1991-94  4.9  -1.9  -1.5  -.4  3.0  -2.2  -.7  -1.5 
Net worth  1986-91  5.7  .8  .3  .5  5.7  .7  .0  .7 
1991-94  3.6  -.6  -1.2  .5  3.9  -1.0  -.7  -.3 
Real land  1986-91  4.3  2.1  2.4  -.3  4.7  1.8  .4  1.4 
prices  1991-94  4.8  -1.9  -2.4  .5  4.5  -1.6  -.3  -1.3 
Notes: 
1.  Each set of estimates  is computed  from VARs in the four variables (y, c, z, k), where  z = ln(real exchange  rate), ln(real net worth),  or ln(real land prices).  The sample 
period  is  1964-94.  The  unrestricted  VAR is  computed  by  transforming  the  OLS estimates  of  a VAR  in  (k -  k*, Ak*, Ac, Az).  The  restricted  VAR begins  with  the 
unrestricted  estimates  and imposes  restrictions  as described  in the Appendix. 
2.  The real exchange  rate is computed  as: (nominal  yen/dollar  exchange  rate) x  (U.S.  GDP deflator,  1985 =  100) / (Japanese  GDP deflator,  1985 =  100). The deflator for 
net worth  is that for the capital stock; for land prices,  the GDP deflator. 
3.  See notes  to Table 9 for an explanation  of panel  (b); notes  to Table 10 for an explanation  of panel  (a). 320 *  KIYOTAKI  & WEST 
cients on the remaining variables are similar to those reported in Table 8; 
in particular, k -  k* retains its ability to predict Ak* and Ac in all three 
specifications.)  For all three variables, the response  of k to a shock to y is 
smaller  in  the  restricted  than  in  the  unrestricted  system.  [In all three 
specifications,  the long  run has effectively  been  reached by 10 periods, 
and  shocks  to y still have  persistent  effects  on y.  The response  to y is 
only  0.00 in the net-worth  system  (for example),  because  the shock to y 
leads to a 10-period-ahead  increase in c as large as that in y.] In general, 
however,  the impulse  response  functions are similar to those reported in 
Table 10. 
The panel  (b) decompositions  for the last cycle are not quite as consis- 
tent with previous  results.  The unrestricted estimates  for net worth and 
land prices yield  positive  shocks  to k in the 1991-1994  [column (6)], and 
the restricted estimates  generally  attribute a larger fraction of the move- 
ment in k to k-shocks [column (10)]. 
That there  is  a discrepancy  between  the  unrestricted  and  restricted 
impulse  response  functions  for output  means  that to some  degree  our 
present  value  model  fails to capture  the  dynamics  of the VAR. This is 
perhaps  supportive  of the view  that fluctuations  in net worth,  or land 
prices,  affect capital accumulation  in ways  not modeled  by us.  It is also 
consistent  with  the  argument  in  several  papers  that credit constraints 
have important influences  on business  investment  in Japan. 
However,  some  of the differences  between  such papers and ours may 
be more apparent than real. In the previous  section, we found a Q-model 
to have  little explanatory  power  for investment.  It is therefore not clear 
that  there  is  a conflict  between  our  general  conclusions  and  those  of 
papers  that show  that the addition  of various variables, including  ones 
proxying credit constraints,  improve the fit of Q-models (e.g.,  Hoshi and 
Kashyap,  1990; Hoshi,  Kashyap,  and Scharfstein,  1991). In addition,  the 
standard errors in panel  (a) of Table 11 are large for net worth and land 
prices,  and we  have  argued  above  that if we  set the point  estimates  on 
net worth  or land prices to zero-that  is,  omit them from the system- 
the present-value  model  seems  to characterize the data well.20 
While  we  find no  direct contradiction  between  our results  and  some 
earlier ones,  we  do feel as well  that the results in our and other papers 
are suggestive  of the importance of continuing  to analyze the interaction 
of  asset  prices  and  business  investment.  Other  priorities  for research 
using  the approach  of our paper include  use  of quarterly data, analysis 
of the  determinants  of  the  cost  of capital sufficiently  detailed  to allow 
20. This is consistent  with Brunner and Kamin's (1995) conclusion  that financial factors did 
not play a very prominent  role in the recent period. Business  Fixed  Investment  and  the  Recent  Business  Cycle  in Japan  ?  321 
explicit  treatment  of monetary  policy, and development  of models  that 
derive the behavior  of output  and the cost of capital endogenously. 
Appendix 
Here  we  discuss  (1) estimation  of the  restricted  system,  and  (2) boot- 
strapping. 
1 ESTIMATION  OF THE  RESTRICTED  SYSTEM 
Take the case in which f = (Ak*, Ac)'; extension  to larger information sets 
is straightforward.  Recall that Z is ordered so Z =  (k -  k*, Ak*, Ac)'. Let 
H =  [rTij], and  let a0 =  (ba,  ba,  0)',  a1 =  (-1  -  a  -  ba,  -  a,  0)',  a2  =  (a,  0, 
0)'. Then,  ignoring  constants,  (6.6) and (4.13) together imply E[ao'Zt,, + 
al  Zt  +  a2  Zt-l  | Zt-l,  Zt-2  .  ..]  =  0, 
whence 
(0, 0, 0) = a'ln2 + al'H  + a2'  (gl(7,  b, a), g2(H, b, a), g3(H, b, a)).  (A.1) 
Using  an 'imposed  value  of b =  0.95 and the least-squares  estimates  of 
the  Tii's  (i = 2,3, j =  1,2,3), we solve linearly for the a that sets gl(H, b, a) 
=  0. (Thus, we  ignore  the information  on a also contained  in g2 and g3.) 
We compute  A as the smaller root of the quadratic implied by A/a  = (1 - 
A)(1 -  bA).  To solve for the implied process for E[kt  -  kt*IZt1,  Zt2,  ...  ]- 
call it E(kt -  kt)-we  hold  a fixed and use an iterative technique  to find 
rT11,  rT12  and  rt13  that,  in conjunction  with  the least-squares  estimates  of 
the  other  Tri's  (i  =  2,3,  j  =  1,2,3)  and  this  fixed  estimate  of a,  yield  a 
stable matrix H that satisfies  (A. 1). 
For computing  forecasts such as in Table 9, estimates  of coefficients  of 
deterministic  terms are also required. For the Ak* and Ac equations,  the 
unrestricted  estimates  are used.  For the k -  k* equation,  we  use  least- 
squares regressions  of the time series {(kt -  kt) -  E(kt-k  )} on the deter- 
ministic  terms. 
2 BOOTSTRAPPING 
We generated  1000 sets of samples  of size 31 (inference about full-sample 
estimates)  and  1000 of size  21 (post-1973 sample).  We obtained  a given 
one  of  the  1000 samples  by  generating  data recursively,  using  the  re- 
stricted estimates  and sampling  with replacement  from the 3 x  1 vectors 
of residuals  to the restricted system.  The actual 1963 (full sample) or 1973 
(post-1973  sample)  data were used  for initial conditions.  Obtaining  1000 
sets of estimates  involved  generation of 1082 samples  of size 31 and 1010 322 *  KIYOTAKI  & WEST 
samples  of size  21. The additional  samples  were  ones  that produced  a 
negative  estimate  of  a,  a  signal  to  us  to  abort the  algorithm  used  to 
obtain  the  restricted  estimates  (a  <  0  does  not  guarantee  A real and 
stable). 
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tional  neoclassical  model  of  investment  as  their  guide,  they  estimate  a 
variety  of vector  autoregressions  (VARs),  which  they  then  use  to decom- 
pose  forecast  errors  in  capital  accumulation.  They  find  that  for  some  of 
their  VARs  a  large  fraction  of  the  unexpected  movement  in  the  capital 
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to  output  and  the  cost  of  capital.  On  the  basis  of  this  finding  they 
conclude  that,  given  the  movements  in output  and the  cost of capital, 
the movements  in investment  that occurred over the period in question 
are consistent  with historical experience. 
Unfortunately,  the authors do not really explain the dramatic behavior 
of investment.  If the behavior  of investment  is largely accounted  for by 
output and the cost of capital, then to understand  the behavior of invest- 
ment  we  have  to account  for the movements  in output  and the cost of 
capital.  This  issue  is  not  addressed  by  the  authors.  Since  the  cost  of 
capital  as  measured  by  K&W does  not  vary  much  over  the  period  in 
question,  it makes sense  to focus on the behavior of output.  Here I argue 
that to understand  the behavior  of output  one has to take into account 
the conduct  of monetary  policy  and the behavior  of stock prices.  I find 
that movements  in output  are mostly  explained  by monetary policy and 
innovations  in stock prices. Monetary policy over the period in question 
appears to have been driven by the extraordinary asset price movements 
around  the  time  of  the  onset  of  the  recession.  The  role  of  monetary 
policy  and  stock  prices  in  the  recent  recession  is  largely  ignored  by 
K&W. 
In the  remainder  of this  comment  I briefly review  and  interpret  the 
empirical  work  on  which  K&W's conclusion  is  based.  I then  review 
recent economic  history in Japan. Using this review as a guide,  I estimate 
several  VARs and  use  them  to  support  my  contention  that  monetary 
policy  and  stock  price  movements  are  the  key  to  accounting  for  the 
behavior  of investment.  Finally, I relate the empirical findings  discussed 
here to the findings  reported by K&W. 
K&W's conclusion  is based  for the most  part on a first-order VAR in 
terms of the vector (kt  -  Yt  -  ct, AYt  -  A ct, Ac)', where the notation is the 
same  as in their paper. This VAR is derived  from a conventional  partial 
equilibrium adjustment  cost model of investment  and is perfectly reason- 
able in the context of this model.  K&W estimate this model using annual 
data and then transform it into its level form, which consists  of a VAR in 
the levels  of the capital stock, output,  and the cost of capital. They focus 
on two  versions  of their VAR. In one  version,  which  they  call an unre- 
stricted VAR, they  do not impose  a present-value  condition  implied  by 
their model.  In the other version,  which  they call a restricted VAR, they 
impose  this present-value  condition.  Both VARs in fact implicitly impose 
a further restriction  on  the  dynamic  interaction  between  the  variables 
they  consider,  which  is that two  lags  of output  and  the  cost  of capital 
appear in the level VAR, but the capital stock appears with only one lag. 
The residuals in the level VARs are orthogonalized,  and historical decom- 
positions  of the series are undertaken. Comment 325 
K&W reach their conclusion  by observing  that innovations  to output 
and  the  cost  of  capital  account  for a large fraction of  the  deviation  of 
capital from its forecast level in the 1991-1994  period,  just as they do in 
the  preceding  1986-1991  interval.  From this perspective,  one  does  not 
have  to appeal  to the behavior  of asset  prices or other variables in the 
periods  leading  up  to the  recession  to account  for the behavior  of the 
capital stock, and thus investment,  during the recession. 
The robustness  of this conclusion  will rest principally on whether  the 
econometric  models  are correctly specified.  Output and the cost of capi- 
tal  are  included  in  the  estimation  because  they  are  postulated  to  be 
useful  for forecasting  future capital stocks,  or more precisely future "de- 
sired" capital stocks.  Within the context of the K&W analysis  one is led 
immediately  to wonder  whether  other variables may be useful  for fore- 
casting desired  capital and whether  including  these variables in the esti- 
mation may overturn the main conclusion. 
In thinking  about  this issue  it is helpful  to recall the relationship  be- 
tween  VARs and dynamic  stochastic models.  Under reasonable assump- 
tions,  any such  model  will have as a reduced  form a VAR of some  form 
or another.  Assuming  the data can be accurately characterized in terms 
of a stationary  model  driven by exogenous  impulses,  one can in princi- 
ple  estimate  the  underlying  model  and  impulses  using  a VAR. This is 
one  of  the  virtues  of VAR analysis.  If the model  is correctly specified, 
then one can disentangle  the contribution of the various impulses  to the 
dynamics  of the endogenous  variables. 
There  are  two  potential  pitfalls  here.  The  first  is  that  if  the  VAR 
representation  of the true model  involves  more variables than included 
in  the  estimation,  the  identification  of  the  exogenous  shocks  will  be 
problematic.  Second,  by  excluding  relevant  variables  the  propagation 
mechanism  implicit  in  the  underlying  structural model  will  be  incor- 
rectly  estimated.  These  problems  can lead  to  misleading  inference  re- 
garding historical decompositions. 
K&W recognize  this and consider including other variables in the VARs 
to  assess  the  robustness  of  their  findings  based  on  the  three-variable 
VARs. They find that by including measures of the real exchange rate, net 
worth,  or real land prices in their VARs, own  innovations  in the capital 
stock account  for a much  larger fraction of the capital stock movements 
than in the three-variable VARs. These findings suggest their main conclu- 
sion  is too  strong  and  point  toward  the  likelihood  that their empirical 
models  are inadequate  for explaining  the behavior of investment. 
Given  the  ambiguity  of  K&W's empirical  findings,  it  seems  worth- 
while  to dig more deeply  into the question  of accounting  for the behav- 
ior of investment.  My strategy for doing  this in some  ways  is similar to 326 *  FISHER 
that taken by K&W. In particular I estimate VARs and use them to decom- 
pose  forecast  errors in key  variables.  However,  my  approach  involves 
focusing  on  a  different  set  of  variables  than  considered  by  K&W. To 
appreciate  the  approach  I take,  a brief review  of recent Japanese  eco- 
nomic history is in order. In my review I place considerable  emphasis  on 
the  conduct  of Japanese  monetary  policy  over  the period  in question.1 
To begin  with,  consider  the paths  of real stock and land prices along 
with  a key money  market interest  rate in the periods  leading  up to the 
recession,  as  shown  in  K&W's Figure  2a,  b,  and  c,  respectively.  The 
interest  rate I consider  is  the  call rate on  money  market transactions. 
Students  of Japanese monetary policy [see for example Yoshikawa (1993)] 
have argued that this interest rate plays a role in the conduct of monetary 
policy  similar  to  that  played  by  the  federal  funds  rate in  the  United 
States.  Okina (1993) explains  how  "the Bank of Japan's monetary  policy 
always begins  with  controlling  interest  rates in short-term  money  mar- 
kets" (p. 32, Okina's italics). 
Starting  in  1982,  stock  prices  on  the  Tokyo stock  exchange  began  a 
dramatic inflation,  which  ended  in equally dramatic fashion  a little less 
than  two  years  before  the  onset  of recession  at the beginning  of 1992. 
Land  prices  were  also  growing  during  this  period.  Between  1985 and 
1988 the Bank of Japan, after pressure from the United States, conducted 
a deliberate  policy  of low  interest  rates. This was  to help  U.S.  efforts to 
contain  its budget  and  current-account  deficits.  In this  period  of what 
market observers  generally  regarded as lax monetary  policy, both share 
and land price inflation accelerated. 
In 1989 Mr. Yasushi  Mieno  was  appointed  the  new  governor  of the 
Bank of Japan. Mr. Mieno,  a career central banker, was considered  to be 
a Paul Volcker-type  tight-money  governor.  On  several  occasions  in the 
early period  of his  tenure  he  made  public  statements  emphasizing  his 
concerns  about asset  price inflation  in Japan. These  concerns  appear to 
have been due to the heavy involvement  of banks and nonfinancial firms 
in the stock and property  markets around  this time.  Corporations were 
able to use  new  equity issues  and the steep rise in stock prices as a very 
cheap  way  of  financing  capital expenditures.2  Many  firms were  using 
surplus  cash to invest in the stock market in order to improve the bottom 
line in a time of slow  growth  in the returns from operating  their capital 
1. This  review  of  events  leading  up  to the  recession  in Japan relies  heavily  on  accounts 
given  in various issues  of The Economist  newspaper  from 1988 to 1993. 
2. This appears  to be captured  to some  degree  in the cost-of-capital  series constructed  by 
K&W (Figure 4a),  probably because  c in the  paper includes  the call rate. As  an aside, 
notice  that c works off a constant-risk-premium  assumption.  This may matter a lot if the 
stock market and the rest of the domestic  and international capital market are playing  a 
role in the implicit cost of capital. Comment 327 
stocks.  In addition,  Tokyo banks were  using  unrealized  capital gains in 
the  stock  market  to  meet  capital  adequacy  requirements,  increasingly 
important given  the staged increases in these requirements stipulated by 
the  Bank of International  Settlements.  Lenders  generally  and banks  in 
particular were  using  property increasingly  and extensively  as collateral 
in a growing  proportion  of their credit provision. 
It appears  that  Mr. Mieno  was  worried  that  a version  of  the  U.S. 
savings  and loan  crisis could  emerge  in Japan and that this could  have 
serious  repercussions  for the macroeconomy.  He was  reported  to have 
sent delegations  to the United Kingdom and the United States to investi- 
gate how  their financial authorities  dealt with  the property collapses  in 
London  and the savings  and loan crisis, and this was  some  time before 
asset  prices  peaked.  In all of  this  we  should  caution  that  there  were 
plenty  of underlying  reasons  for the  asset  price growth  besides  the  li- 
quidity  in the  system  provided  by the central bank's lax policy and the 
obvious  opportunities  for speculation  at this time.  The national  saving 
rate was  growing,  indicating  growing  rates of personal  saving,  and,  as 
the capital stock series in K&W's Figure la indicates,  saving in the form 
of capital spending  by firms was  high.  In a regulatory  environment  in 
which  the  range  of financial instruments  was  limited  mostly  to equity, 
the stock market was likely to be in for some  significant growth. 
Mr.  Mieno's  concern  about  the  repercussions  of  perceived  unwar- 
ranted asset price inflation is one reason given for the steep rise in inter- 
est rates that began with his tenure at the central bank. From its trough in 
1987 to its peak in 1991 the call rate went  from less than 4% to more than 
8%. Half way  through  this rise,  share prices peaked  and began  a steep 
descent.  Only when  land prices peaked did the call rate begin to fall. And 
around the time of the beginning  of the recession,  interest rates peaked. 
These  facts suggest  that monetary  policy  may have  played  an impor- 
tant role in determining  the  timing  of the recession  and that monetary 
policy in the period leading  up to the onset  of the recession  was heavily 
influenced  by concerns  about asset price inflation.  Before turning to my 
VAR analysis  it  is  instructive  to  examine  the  behavior  of  key  macro 
aggregates  over the business  cycle in the periods leading up to the reces- 
sion.  In Figure  1 are plotted  HP-filtered  macro aggregates  starting  in 
1987:1 (the call rate is unfiltered).3 Using  simple IS-LM analysis to inter- 
pret the data, it should  be clear from this figure that the recent recession 
fits closely  a classic response  of an economy  to a leftward shift in the LM 
curve induced  by a reduction in the supply  of narrow money. Detrended 
real balances  fall as the call rate rises. In this period inventories  accumu- 
3. The filtering is based  on the sample  1961:1-1994:4. 328 *  FISHER 
Figure  1 THE  RECENT  RECESSION  IN JAPAN 
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late relative  to  trend.  Around  the  time  of the  peak  in inventories,  the 
detrended  GDP begins  to fall. Interestingly, the peak in plant and equip- 
ment investment  leads  the GDP peak (business  investment  usually  lags 
the cycle in the United States). This is consistent  with the IS-LM view  of 
investment  being  closely  tied  to interest  rates, given  notions  of lags in 
investment  decision  making,  the long runup in the call rate, and the fact 
that investment  peaks when  the call rate peaks. 
Thus the Japanese  data are consistent  with  the notion  that the reces- 
sion was brought on by "tight" monetary policy as would  be predicted at 
the level  of IS-LM  analysis.  (Interestingly, if we analyze  the eight reces- 
sions in the interval from 1961:1 to 1994:4, at least five of them appear to 
be consistent  with  leftward  shifts  in the LM curve.)  Having  confirmed 
that the monetary  policy view  of the recession  is not obviously  inconsis- 
tent  with  the  data,  it  is  now  necessary  to  take  into  account  that  (1) 
aggregate  variables  are  determined  by  a  variety  of  aggregate  distur- 
bances,  and  (2) monetary  policy  has  both  exogenous  and  endogenous 
elements.  This will help us disentangle  the behavior of output or invest- 
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policy  variation  due  to  asset  price  movements,  and  the  independent 
influence  of asset prices. 
To do this I follow  along  a line of researchers who  have  studied  U.S. 
and Japanese monetary  policy in the context of reduced-form VARs [see 
for  example  Sims  (1992),  Bemanke  and  Blinder  (1992),  Christiano, 
Eichenbaum,  and  Evans  (1994), Yoshikawa  (1993)]. My  objective  is  to 
specify  a VAR which  can be used  to disentangle  monetary  policy  from 
other  influences.  The  conventional  approach  to  this  problem  involves 
selecting  a policy  target variable and specifying  a reaction function  for 
the monetary  authority which  depends  on current and lagged  values  of 
endogenous  variables.  In  deciding  which  variables  to  include  in  my 
VARs and the manner in which orthogonalizations  are conducted,  I have 
tried to incorporate both the information from my short lesson  on recent 
economic  history  in Japan and the work of scholars who  have used  this 
kind of analysis  to study Japanese monetary policy before me. 
I focus  my discussion  on two  types  of quarterly VARs estimated  over 
the  period  1964:1 to  1994:4 with  four  lags.4 The  first type,  stock price 
VARs, include  a measure  of the  real stock price,  denoted  PK (Interna- 
tional Financial Statistics  variable FPS6JP divided  by the GDP deflator), 
and the  second  type,  KW VARs, do not.5 I consider  VARs of both types 
with  one  expenditure  component,  GDP, later denoted  Y, and with  two 
expenditure  components,  Y and  plant  and  equipment  investment  (I). 
The Y-VARs help address  a key unresolved  question  from K&W's paper. 
Namely,  what  is the composition  of the output  innovations  in their em- 
pirical models? 
In addition  to  Y, the  other variables considered  in all the VARs ana- 
lyzed  below  are net exports (NX), GDP deflator inflation (INFL), the call 
rate (R), and the velocity  of narrow money  (VE).6 I include  NX because 
there is evidence  to suggest  this was  a key influence  on the conduct  of 
policy  over the sample  period  (see Yoshikawa,  1993). The variable INFL 
is included  because,  at least since the first oil shock, the Bank of Japan is 
generally  regarded  as being  quite  sensitive  to its innovations.  I follow 
Yoshikawa  in  using  the  call rate because  it appears  to be  the  obvious 
4. The lag length  is sufficient  to guarantee  that the null hypothesis  of no serial correlation 
cannot be rejected at conservative  significance  levels  for all the estimated  reduced-form 
residuals  in all the VARs discussed  here. Like K&W, I include a dummy  for the floating- 
exchange-rate  period.  The results are not sensitive  to this. 
5. Including  land  prices  in  the  VARs does  not  influence  the  results  appreciably. This is 
probably not surprising,  given  measurement  issues. 
6. Narrow  money  velocity  equals  nominal  GDP divided  by the IFS measure  of the sum of 
currency  outside  banks  and  demand  deposits  other  than  those  of the  central govern- 
ment.  Variables PK, Y, I, and  VE are in logs,  INFL is the log first difference of the GDP 
deflator,  NX  is  the  log  difference  between  exports  and  imports  measured  on  a GNP 
basis,  and R is the log of the gross call rate. Effect  of NX  on Y 
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choice  for  the  monetary  policy  target variable.7 Finally, velocity  is  in- 
cluded for two reasons.  First, it is an attempt to capture financial innova- 
tions, including  ongoing  regulatory intervention,  which are a potentially 
important factor in the behavior  of asset prices.  Second,  its innovations 
account for 14% of the unconditional  variance of Y, the largest contribu- 
tion aside from own  innovations  to y.8 
Consider  the KW type  Y-VAR first. The Wold causal (Choleski) order- 
ing I work with is NX, Y, AP, R, and V.9 Generally, the ordering does not 
appear  important  for the  results  reported  here  and  below,  although  I 
7. Yoshikawa  analyzed  Japanese  monetary  policy and the Japanese  monetary  transmission 
mechanism  using VARs  estimated  from  monthly  data  on the call  rate, the growth  rate  of 
industrial  production,  CPI  inflation,  and net exports. 
8. Notice that the yen/dollar exchange rate is not include in the VARs  even though it is 
often cited as a key determinant  of monetary policy. Including it in the analysis does not 
change the main findings. 
9. Implicit  in this ordering  is the assumption  that lagged values of all the variables  appear 
in the monetary  policy authorities'  reaction  function  for  R, and contemporaneous  values 
only of the variables  in front of R in the ordering. 
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have not considered  all possibilities.10 For this case I proceed  directly to 
the historical  decomposition  of Y plotted  in Figure 2. The solid lines  in 
the plots here are the actual values for Y over the period 1987:4 to 1994:4, 
and the  short-dashed  line  is the forecast as of 1987:3. The long-dashed 
line is the contribution  of the indicated variable's orthogonalized  innova- 
tion on  Y. Recall that these  capture all of the impact of the innovations 
on the variable being  decomposed  relative to the expected  path assum- 
ing no innovations.  Immediately  we  see from the "Effect of Y on Y" plot 
that  output  innovations  identified  with  this  model  roughly  speaking 
account  for the recession  themselves,  via the estimated  lag structure in 
the model  of course. 
If I is included  in the VAR, the decomposition  for Y is almost identical 
(not  shown).  In Figure  3 I display  the  decompositions  for I for such  a 
VAR with  I included  after  Y in  the  ordering.  Notice  the  strong  role 
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played  by output  innovations  in accounting  for investment.  Exogenous 
monetary  policy  plays  a role here in dragging investment  down,  as do I 
innovations,  especially  leading up to onset of the recession.  Since output 
innovations  and  interest-rate  innovations  play  a large role here  in the 
determination  of  investment  over  the  recent  recession,  these  results 
could be construed  as being  generally  supportive  of K&W's conclusion. 
However,  they suffer from the problem shown  in Figure 2 that the reces- 
sion in output  remains unexplained,  as in K&W. 
Now  consider  the stock price, Y-VAR. This VAR plays a central role in 
the analysis,  so it is useful  to get some sense  of the quality of the identifi- 
cation.  For this  purpose,  consider  the  implied  impulse  response  func- 
tions  with  Monte  Carlo one-standard-error  bands  for orthogonalized  R 
innovations  in Figure 4 and PK innovations  in Figure 5. The responses  to 
the  monetary  disturbances  conform  generally  with  standard  priors on 
these  responses,  with  the exception  of the behavior  of inflation,  which 
exhibits  the  Sims  (1992) price puzzle.  Here  we  see  that inflation  does 
come  down  after the call rate peaks in response  to an exogenous  mone- Comment  *  333 
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tary disturbance.  The delayed  response  of inflation  may just reflect the 
typically  slow  response  to inflation by the Bank of Japan in the sample. 
In Figure 5 we  see  that PK-innovations  have  a transitory impact on PK. 
The other responses  seem sensible.  Notice the delay in the response  of R 
to these  innovations  as well.  Roughly,  the impulse  response  functions 
for the  other  innovations  can be  explained  in  an internally  consistent 
way  (these  are not shown). 
In Figure 6 I display  the historical  decomposition  of R, the  assumed 
monetary  target,  for  the  asset  price  Y-VAR. In the  period  before  Mr. 
Mieno's  tenure at the central bank began,  the interest rate appears deter- 
mined  by its own  innovations.  Relative to what policy would  have been 
without  monetary  innovations  and only output innovations,  the interest 
rate is  very  low,  consistent  with  the  market  view  of  loose  monetary 
policy. When  the governorship  of the Bank of Japan changes,  monetary 
innovations  take interest  rates higher,  but eventually  it is the  accumu- 
lated effects  of PK innovations  which  drive the call rate to its peak.  PK 
innovations  contribute  much  to keeping  interest rates high  even  as ex- 334 *  FISHER 
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ogenous  policy  is pulling  them  down.  Broadly speaking,  then,  the his- 
torical decomposition  of R appears consistent  with  the recent economic 
history  of Japan. Figure 7 shows  the decomposition  of PK. Notice  that, 
with  the exception  of minor influences  due to inflation innovations  and 
monetary  policy  disturbances,  the  real  stock  price  seems  determined 
almost entirely by its own innovations.  This supports the view that stock 
price inflation  around  this time is exogenous  in the sense  that it is not 
determined  by the historical relationship  between  PK and its underlying 
fundamentals. 
Now  for the  main  empirical  finding  of this  comment,  which  is con- 
tained in Figure 8. This shows  the decomposition  of Y in the stock price 
Y-VAR. Notice  that in contrast  to the  KW type,  Y-VAR output  innova- 
tions alone would  drive output  to a peak at a year later than the realized 
level of output: the recession  in output is not explained by output alone. 
Three variables  contribute  to  the  timing  of the recession  by exerting  a 
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negative  influence  on output after it peaks: NX, PK, and R. The influence 
of R is minuscule,  meaning  that exogenous  monetary disturbances  only 
play a small part in the timing of the recession.  The influence  of PK easily 
dominates  NX. Its peak negative  contribution is more than five times the 
peak of NX negative  contribution  to output,  and in no period after the 
onset  of the recession  does  NX dominate  the influence  of PK. 
An  attempt  to disentangle  the influence  of PK on  Y via endogenous 
monetary  policy and an independent  influence  via the internal propaga- 
tion mechanism  of the estimated  model  is given  in Figure 9. This figure 
is the "Effect of PK on Y" plot from Figure 8 with one additional (dotted) 
line.  The line  convention  in this figure is consistent  with  the previous 
figures.  Here the additional  line shows  the implied  value  of output  if R 
follows  the  expected  path as shown  in Figure 6. Thus interest  rates do 
not respond  to PK-innovations  for this experiment.  Notice  that for this 
case the implied  level  of Y is above  the long-dashed  line,  which  shows 
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Figure  8 
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the effect with  policy  influence.  This suggests  that the endogenous  re- 
sponse  of policy  to innovations  in PK is important  for the behavior  of 
output  at the start of the recession.  The common  shapes  of the implied 
output  plots  suggest  an additional  independent  influence  of PK on  Y. 
Figure 10 shows  the investment  decomposition  for the stock price VAR 
including  both  Y and  I.  Notice  the  strong  leading  influence  of  PK- 
innovations  on investment. 
To summarize,  apparently  exogenous  movements  in stock prices ap- 
pear  to  have  exhibited  a  strong  influence  on  monetary  policy  in  the 
periods  leading  up to the onset  of the recession.  Innovations  in PK, via 
the  response  of  monetary  policy,  appear  to  account  for  much  of  the 
behavior  of output  at the beginning  of the recession  and the behavior of 
investment  leading  up  to and during  the recession.  These results  seem 
consistent  with events  as they were reported in the financial press at the 
time.  They  support  the conclusion  that monetary  policy was  an impor- Comment*  337 
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tant factor in determining  both the timing and the severity of the recent 
recession.  The independent  influence  of PK-innovations adds to the im- 
pression  that  the  behavior  of  stock  prices is also  important  for under- 
standing  the recession. 
How  do  these  findings  relate  to  the  main  conclusion  arrived at by 
K&W? The  findings  do  not  contradict  the  conclusion  that output  and 
cost  of  capital  movements  are largely  responsible  for the  behavior  of 
investment,  and in this sense  they should  be viewed  as complementary 
to K&W's work.  The fact that endogenous  policy as estimated  from past 
data accounts  for a considerable  portion of the fall in output  (and invest- 
ment)  is also  consistent  with  the  view  that the  recent recession  is not 
anomalous  relative to historical experience.  The fact that movements  in 
PK are estimated  to be largely exogenous,  and appear to exert an inde- 
pendent  influence  on output  and investment,  is not consistent  with this 
view.  In  addition,  the  findings  suggest  an  explanation  for the  move- 
ments  in output  and in turn the behavior  of investment  which  is absent 
from K&W's paper. Thus the results may well add to our understanding 
of the recent recession  in Japan. Effect of NX on I 
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Comment 
DAVID  SCHARFSTEIN 
Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology 
The late 1980s were boom  years in Japan. GDP growth and fixed invest- 
ment  rates rose  to their highest  levels  since  the  1973 oil shock.  At the 
same  time,  asset  prices  rose  dramatically: stock prices and  land  prices 
nearly tripled from 1985 to 1990. 
The early 1990s were much different. GDP growth and fixed investment 
slowed.  Stock prices  fell by about  half, and land prices  fell by about  a 
quarter. The Japanese economy  of the 1980s-once  thought to be a reflec- 
tion of Japan's extraordinary economic  strength and growth prospects- 
came to be known  as the "bubble economy." 
One  of the  notable  aspects  of this  recent  experience  is the extent  to 
which  economic  growth  and  investment  moved  in  tandem  with  asset 
prices.  Of course,  it should  not  be  surprising  that the  two  moved  to- 
gether,  because  asset  prices rationally reflect current and future growth 
prospects  (at least partially). But the extreme movements  in asset prices 
led  some  observers  to  argue  that  they  may  have  caused some  of  the 
changes  in  economic  growth  rather than just  reflected  those  changes. 
In particular, given  that many companies  in Japan own land and stock 
in other companies,  they realized enormous  capital gains on those hold- 
ings  during  the  late  1980s.  These  unrealized  capital  gains  served  as 
collateral which  enabled  Japanese companies  to borrow  at low  interest 
rates,  easing  credit constraints  and promoting  investment  and growth. 
The  decline  in  asset  values  had  the  opposite  effect  in  the  bust  of  the 
1990s.  Of course,  this  explanation  only  makes  sense  if capital markets 
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collateral which  enabled  Japanese companies  to borrow  at low  interest 
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are imperfect and firms are credit-constrained  in their investment.  Thus, 
with  imperfect  capital markets,  growth  affects asset values  (through the 
standard  link),  but asset  values  also affect growth.  Models  along  these 
lines  have  been  presented  by Kiyotaki and Moore (1995) and Kashyap, 
Scharfstein,  and Weil (1989). 
Kiyotaki and West take a step back and ask the question: Can neoclassi- 
cal models  of investment-in  particular the flexible accelerator model  in 
which  interest  rates and  adjustment  costs  are all that matter-explain 
the movements  in investment  over this period? Their answer is yes; one 
need  not cook up more complex  models  of investment  based on imper- 
fect capital markets to explain the recent business  cycle. 
At one level I agree with Kiyotaki and West. They have done a thought- 
ful and thorough  job of showing  that the flexible accelerator model  is a 
rather good  empirical model  of fixed investment  in Japan during the last 
four decades.  However,  this evidence  does  not amount  to a rejection  of 
collateral  models,  because  the  empirical  specification  of  the  collateral 
model  looks  much  like that of the flexible accelerator model.  The collat- 
eral model  suggests  that increases  in cash  flow  and  asset  values  have 
positive  effects  on  investment.  The flexible accelerator model  says  that 
increases  in  output  should  be  associated  with  increases  in investment 
(due  to adjustment  costs)  and  that lower  interest  rates should  increase 
investment.  But output  and cash flow are highly  correlated,  so the em- 
pirical  effect  of  output  could  simply  be  proxying  for  cash  flow  in  a 
collateral model.  And  since asset  prices are inversely  related to interest 
rates-during  the  boom  years  interest  rates were  low,  and  during  the 
bust years they were high-the  negative  effect of interest rates on invest- 
ment  could  simply  be capturing the effect of asset prices on investment 
in the collateral model.  Thus,  while  it's true that the flexible accelerator 
model  is  a great  empirical  workhorse,  it still does  not  tell us  whether 
adjustment  costs  and  interest  rates  drive  the  results  or whether  cash 
flow and asset values  drive the results. 
At  this  point,  one  might  ask  whether  it is important  to  distinguish 
between  these  models.  That is, if the flexible accelerator model  does  the 
job, why  not just use that and forget about the collateral model? I think 
this is not a good  idea,  for two reasons.  First, the two models  have very 
different  efficiency  implications.  The collateral model  implies  that dur- 
ing downturns  investment  inefficiencies  rise, while  the flexible accelera- 
tor model  implies  that firms are always  at the first best.  Thus,  policies 
that have no (or possibly  negative)  effects on welfare in the neoclassical 
model  can be  welfare-enhancing  in the  collateral model.  For example, 
procyclical  corporate  taxation  would  have  no  effect  in the  neoclassical 
model,  but  might  raise welfare  in the  collateral model  (because  it pro- Comment 341 
vides  more  cash  flow  to  firms  in  downturns  and  enables  them  to  in- 
crease investment). 
A second  reason  why  it is important  to distinguish  between  the two 
models  is that it helps  us understand  the distributional effects of down- 
turns.  In  the  neoclassical  model,  the  only  effect  is  through  a rise  in 
interest  rates  which  should  affect  all firms  equally.  But in  a collateral 
model  the firms that are most  hurt by the downturn  are those  that find 
external finance  particularly costly-most  likely small and young  firms. 
Sectors of the economy  with a large number of such firms are likely to be 
the most  adversely  affected by a downturn. 
Finally, as argued  by Bernanke  and  Blinder (1988) and Kashyap  and 
Stein (1995), monetary  policy has very different effects in the two mod- 
els.  In the  neoclassical  investment  model,  monetary  policy  only  affects 
investment  through  interest  rates.  However,  in  the  collateral  model, 
monetary  policy  affects  the  costs  of  making  loans  if,  as Kashyap  and 
Stein argue,  banks are also credit-constrained.  Credit-constrained  firms 
that relied on banks for funding  may then find it difficult to raise alterna- 
tive sources  of funding,  which  may then induce them to cut investment. 
This is a very  different  channel  through  which  monetary  policy  affects 
output. 
I will conclude  by making a point that betrays my own microeconomic 
bias. It seems  to me that there is a limit to what the macroeconomic  data 
can tell us,  and, in the end,  the only real hope is to use micro, firm-level 
data.  There  is  now  a large  literature  that  examines  the  differential  re- 
sponse  of firms to macro shocks.  The idea is that some firms face signifi- 
cant difficulties  raising external finance,  so that a drop in their cash flow 
or collateral should  have a more negative  effect on their investment  than 
would  a drop  in  cash  flow  or collateral of a firm that can more  easily 
adjust  by  raising  external  funds.  In this  spirit,  Fazzari, Hubbard,  and 
Petersen  (1988)  showed  that  low-dividend-paying  firms-which  they 
argue are likely to face greater difficulty raising external capital-seem  to 
cut investment  more in response  to cash-flow  reductions  than do high- 
dividend-paying  firms.  In the  context  of Japan, Hoshi,  Kashyap,  and 
Scharfstein (1991) showed  that firms that are part of a keiretsu-and  thus 
have  close  ties  to  banks,  their  principal  suppliers  of  capital-are  less 
prone  to  cut  investment  when  cash  flow  falls.  In both  datasets,  the 
difference  between  constrained  firms and  unconstrained  firms is most 
pronounced  during  recessions.  There are numerous  other studies  with 
similar  results,  some  more  convincing  than  others.  [For a particularly 
clever  approach  to  this  problem,  see  Lamont's  (1996) paper.]  On  the 
whole,  I believe  that the effects  of collateral are real and that they have 
meaningful  macroeconomic  implications. 342 *  DISCUSSION 
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Olivier Blanchard asked  the authors to clarify their interpretation of the 
1991-1994  results  for investment  and the user cost of capital. He noted 
that standard theory predicts that a low user cost will be associated  with 
a high  rate of investment,  but the  authors  seem  to be arguing  for low 
user cost  as a reason  for declining  investment.  Blanchard also found  it 
surprising  that the measured  cost of capital had been  found  to decline, 
since  the  crash of the Japanese  stock market during  this period  would 
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although  the combination  observed  in Japan of an upward  trend in the 
capital-output  ratio and a downward  trend in the relative price of invest- 
ment  goods  is  consistent  with  the  theory,  this  relationship  is not  very 
robust across countries; in particular, many industrialized  countries have 
seen  declines  in  both  the  relative  price  of  investment  goods  and  the 
capital-output  ratio,  at least  since  the  late  1970s. He  suggested  that it 
would  be useful  to try to reconcile this model  with developments  in the 
European  countries,  for example. 
Responding,  Kenneth  West agreed that, all else equal, a low user cost 
of  capital  should  indeed  be  associated  with  high  investment;  and  he 
pointed  to Table 10 in the paper, which indicates that the estimated  level 
of the  desired  capital stock did increase.  However,  he argued  that, be- 
cause  of  adjustment  costs,  a  decline  in  the  cost  of  capital  will  have 
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cause  of  adjustment  costs,  a  decline  in  the  cost  of  capital  will  have Discussion 343 
important  effects  on realized investment  only if it is expected  to persist; 
and  that,  historically,  the cost of capital in Japan had shown  significant 
mean  reversion.  In this particular episode,  West added,  potential  inves- 
tors may  have  seen  the  decline  in the  cost  of capital as due  largely  to 
monetary  policy,  which  could  have  increased  the  perceived  likelihood 
that it was  a transitory phenomenon.  Following  up this comment,  An- 
drew  Abel  suggested  that  the  authors  should  point  out  explicitly  that 
their estimated  cost-of-capital effects would  change once policies leading 
to  permanent  changes  in  the  cost  of  capital  were  considered;  he  ex- 
pressed  interest  in seeing  what  the Kiyotaki-West  estimates  would  im- 
ply for such changes,  due for example  to a change in the tax law. 
Addressing  Blanchard's question  about the dividend/price  ratio, West 
noted  that in their paper the equity-financed  portion of the cost of capital 
is  calculated  as  a constant  premium  over  the  cost  of  short-term  debt. 
West  agreed  that  this  methodology  implies  that  the  gyrations  of  the 
stock  market do  not  enter  the  cost  of capital, but he  argued  that what 
matters  for the  purposes  of  estimating  investment  equations  is the  ex 
ante,  not ex post,  return on the market. 
James Stock suggested  that more  extensive  stability analyses  (using, 
e.g.,  a Quandt-type  likelihood-ratio  test) would  be desirable,  especially 
for the  capital accumulation  equation.  He  also remarked that a signifi- 
cant  number  of  the  paper's  conclusions  rest  on  a particular Choleski 
decomposition,  for which the authors have provided no particular justifi- 
cation.  West agreed  in principle  about the value  of testing  for stability, 
but said that for reasons of parsimony  they preferred to run all equations 
over the  same  sample  periods.  He defended  the ordering used  in their 
VARs as being  consistent  with  the  conventional  approach  to studying 
investment,  which  is to de-emphasize  simultaneity  issues  and instead to 
explain investment  conditional  on fundamentals,  such as output and the 
cost of capital. 
Several  participants  elaborated  on  David  Scharfstein's  point  in  the 
formal discussion,  that a model  in which  investment  spending  depends 
on  the  quantity  of borrowers'  collateral could  explain  Japanese invest- 
ment  as  well  as  the  authors'  neoclassical  model.  Simon  Gilchrist said 
that Kiyotaki  and  West had  imposed  insufficient  structure to discrimi- 
nate between  the collateral theory and their model; he pointed  out that, 
if collateral effects were  a normal part of the Japanese boom-bust  cycle, 
these  effects  would  be  reflected  in  the  reduced-form  coefficients.  He 
suggested  disaggregation  by sector as a means  of identifying  collateral 
effects.  Ben  Bernanke  noted  that  there  are  important  differences  be- 
tween  the q-theory and the collateral theory which might be exploited  in 
empirical  analysis.  Some  of  these  relate  to  the  traditional  distinction 344  DISCUSSION 
between  average  and marginal q; investment  is related to the former by 
the  collateral  theory  and  to  the  latter by  the  neoclassical  q-theory. He 
cited Owen  Lamont's work on firms with oil and non-oil  subsidiaries  as 
an  example  of  research  that  could  distinguish  the  two  approaches; 
changes  in oil prices should  affect investment  in the non-oil  subsidiaries 
(as Lamont found) according to the collateral theory, but not according to 
the q-theory. In the Japanese context,  Bernanke said, one might apply a 
similar strategy by studying  the effects of land prices on the investment 
of land-holding  firms. 
Responding  to Gilchrist and Bernanke, several people expressed  skep- 
ticism that the collateral-based and neoclassical  theories could be cleanly 
distinguished  empirically.  Zvi  Griliches  noted  that  the  distinction  be- 
tween  average  and marginal q was  muddied  in practice by well-known 
problems  in measuring  the latter, which  depends  on the value of future 
investment  opportunities  rather than on the current assets  of the firm. 
Abel placed the issue  in the broader context of the debate about whether 
complete-markets  or incomplete-markets  models  provide  a better  ap- 
proximation  to reality, suggesting  that this was  a debate  that was  un- 
likely to be resolved  purely on empirical grounds.  Matthew Shapiro and 
Robert  Barsky  each  discussed  the  possibility  that  expectations  about 
future profitability and growth  had driven the large fluctuations  in both 
investment  and  asset  values,  and  noted  the  difficulty  faced  by  the 
econometrician  in establishing  whether  those expectations,  although un- 
realized  ex post,  were  unreasonable  ex ante.  West summarized  the dis- 
cussion by characterizing the paper as showing  that a neoclassical specifi- 
cation could explain the Japanese investment  data, but not as a definitive 
rejection of incomplete-markets  alternatives such as the collateral theory. 
Abel  then  focused  on the fact that, according to the authors'  calcula- 
tions,  q is not infrequently  negative  in the Japanese data, which  seems  to 
imply serious measurement  error. He thought that analyses of investment 
in Japan using  micro-level  data might  therefore be more reliable.  West 
replied that finding  negative  values  for q is common  in studies  of Japan, 
including  micro-level  studies:  He cited a careful panel  data analysis  by 
Takeo Hoshi and Anil Kashyap which found the measured value of q to be 
negative in some 25% of cases. Nobuhiro Kiyotaki expressed the view that 
mismeasurement  of q is indeed  an important issue: For the Japanese case, 
a major problem  is that only  a relatively  small part of the nonfinancial 
corporate  sector  (accounting  for about  12% of employment)  is publicly 
traded,  so that NIPA data and other statistics largely reflect book values 
(which  are gross underestimates)  rather than market values.  The lack of 
market-based  valuations,  plus analogous  problems in obtaining realistic 
land values,  help explain why  q is so often found  to be negative. 